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
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
① THE 4TH WORLD AMATEUR GO CHAMPIONSHIP
第4回 世界アマチュア囲碁選手権戦

1982 3 16 ~ 20 主催 ○日本棋院 後援 外務省・文化庁・国際交流基金 協力 関西棋院



第4回世界アマチュア囲碁選手権戦

第4回世界アマチュア囲碁選手権戦



Nineteen year old Tsao of China defeats his fellow countryman Yang to become the 4th World Amateur Go Champion. (Photo by Tibor Bognar)

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The cover: Preliminary sketch for a painting by Seiko (mid-19th century) showing the Seven Gods of Good Fortune, with Daikoku and Ebisu among them playing go. *Collection of William Pinckard.*

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Go World News

Cho Chikun Takes Judan Title from Otake

Not content with winning the Meijin title from Otake in 1980, Cho has also appropriated Otake's Judan title, leaving the latter with only the Gosei title to his name. In the 20th Judan title match, Cho lost the first game, resigning fairly early because of an incredible blunder, but he went on to win the next three games in a row. Cho is the first player ever to hold the Meijin, Honinbo and Judan titles at the same time. The results:

Game 1 (March 3). Otake (W) won by resignation.
Game 2 (March 11). Cho (W) won by 2½ points.
Game 3 (March 25). Cho (B) won by resignation.
Game 4 (April 1). Cho (W) won by resignation.

Kobayashi Koichi to Challenge Cho Chikun, Scores Perfect Record in Honinbo League

This might turn out to be the year of Kobayashi Koichi: he has won the 37th Honinbo League with a perfect record of seven wins, emulating the performance of Cho last year, and will challenge Cho for the Honinbo title. Kobayashi might be the most dangerous opponent for Cho, for he has the best record against him of any player. In their encounters to date Kobayashi leads with an impressive fifteen wins to Cho's six. The only advantage Cho has is that Kobayashi has no experience of two-day matches. If the title match followed the trend of past results, Kobayashi would win 4-1 or 4-2. That is hardly likely, considering how strong Cho has become in the last year, but go fans can look forward to an exciting match.

As the chart shows, two former Honinbos, Rin

Kaiho and Kato, suffered the unfamiliar humiliation of losing their places in the league (Rin entered it in 1964 and Kato in 1967). Sakata, the greatest Honinbo of them all, managed to hang on to his place once again, together with Takemiya and Hashimoto Shoji.

Kobayashi Leads Meijin League

Kobayashi Koichi's good form is not confined to the Honinbo league: he is also doing very well in the Meijin league and, with a 4-1 score, is the current leader. Considering that he has already played the most formidable members, except for Rin, of the league, he seems to have a good chance of becoming the Meijin challenger also. He is, however, being closely marked by Rin and Otake, who are both on 3-1.

There is some sad news to report from the league. Shimamura Toshihiro, at 70 the oldest member of the league, suffered a stroke during his game with Sakata on 11 March. He is still recuperating and it is not yet known when he will be able to resume his career. In the league he has forfeited his games against Sakata, Kobayashi and Otake.

Other Tournaments

7th Gosei. Kobayashi Koichi has reached the playoff to decide the challenger to Otake Hideo. He defeated Kato in the semifinal and his opponent in the final will be the winner of the Cho-Takemiya semifinal.

NEC Cup. Takemiya defeated Otake in the final to win the 1st NEC Cup, a new TV tournament.

37th Honinbo League

Rank	Name	T	R	K	S	H.U.	I	H.S.	K	Score	Place
1	Takemiya	—	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	4-3	3
2	Rin	0	—	1	0	1	0	0	0	2-5	—
3	Kato	0	0	—	1	1	0	0	0	2-5	—
4	Sakata	1	1	0	—	1	1	0	0	4-3	4
5	Hashimoto U.	1	0	0	0	—	1	0	0	2-5	—
5	Iwata	0	1	1	0	0	—	0	0	2-5	—
5	Hashimoto S.	0	1	1	1	1	1	—	0	5-2	2
5	Kobayashi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	—	7-0	1

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

7th Meijin League (as of 6th May, 1982)

Rank	Name	K	O	R	T	K	Sa	Sh	Ho	Ha	Score
1	Kato	—	1	1		0	0				2 — 2
2	Otake	0	—			1		1	1		3 — 1
3	Rin	0		—			1		1	1	3 — 1
4	Takemiya				—	0	1	0	1	0	2 — 3
5	Kobayashi	1	0		1	—		1		1	4 — 1
6	Sakata	1		0	0		—	1		1	3 — 2
7	Shimamura		0		1	0	0	—	0	0	1 — 5
7	Honda		0	0	0			1	—	0	1 — 4
7	Hane			0	1	0	0	1	1	—	3 — 3

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

7th Kisei. The following dan championships have already been decided in the 7th Kisei tournament.

1-dan: Tei Meiki (who defeated Fujisawa Shuko's son Kāzunari)

2-dan: Hidaka Toshiyuki

3-dan: Ishikura Noboru

4-dan: Imamura Toshiya (Kansai Ki-in)

5-dan: Kanda Ei

6-dan: O Rissei

1st Dutch National Junior Go Championship

The 1st Dutch National Junior Go Championship, open to players under eighteen, was held on 27 February 1982 in the southern city of 's-Hertogenbosch in the auditorium of the Rijks Scholengemeensch school. There were thirty participants (60% of them from the southern part of Holland, where go is becoming more and more popular), their average age was fifteen and their average strength was 10-kyu.

The tournament was played in three groups: the top group with no handicap, the second group with handicap minus two, and the third with full handicap. The most interesting feature of this tournament is that the winner qualifies for the *Inter District Tournament*, which decides the participants in the National Championship (if the winner is already qualified, the 2nd place getter qualifies).

As expected, Gerald Westhoff 2-dan became the 1st National Junior Champion. Second was Mark Gooskens 1-dan, who qualified for the Indis, and third was Mark Boon 1-kyu (age 15). Rudy Verhagen 6-kyu won the 2nd group and Erik Lukkassen (age 13) was the surprise winner of



The 1st Dutch Junior Champion: Gerald Westhoff 2-dan of Chr. Lyceum of Apeldoorn

the 3rd group — at 25-kyu he was ranked bottom in his group, but he still won 4 out of 5 games.

The Nederlandse Go Bond was encouraged to organize this tournament because of the success of the Dutch National Schools Team Championship, which enters its third year this year. This new tournament looks like becoming a very popular one. The promotion of go among teenagers has been one of the most important aims of the Nederlandse Go Bond for some years now.

(Report from Joachin Heydenrijk)

Kido Prizes for 1981


In its March 1982 issue, 'Kido' magazine announced that the 'Kido' prizes for 1980 were awarded as follows.

1. The outstanding player of the year: Cho Chikun, Meijin & Honinbo (second year in a row)

2. The highest number of wins (7-dan and up): Yamashiro Hiroshi 7-dan (38 wins, 10 losses). Second: Cho Chikun 36-10-1 jigo.

3. Best winning percentage (7-dan and up, minimum 27 games): Yamashiro Hiroshi (79.2%). Second: Cho (77.7%).

4. Most consecutive wins (7-dan and up): Yamashiro Hiroshi (12). Second: Cho, Takagawa, Kobayashi Koichi, Awaji Shuzo (11)



Yamashiro 7-dan



Yoda 3-dan

5. The special merit prize: Awaji Shuzo 8-dan (35-13, won the P.M.'s Cup)

6. The fighting spirit prize: Yoda Norimoto 3-dan (41-7-1 jigo). This is the first time that a low-ranked player has won this prize. Yoda (born February 1966) is also the youngest player to win the prize.

7. The prize for technique: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan (35-17)

8. The outstanding woman player: Kusunoki Teruko 6-dan (19-15, won the Women's Kakusei Tournament)

9. The 'new face' prize: Ishikura Noboru 3-dan (35-5-3 jigo)

10. Special Women's Prize: Shiratori Sumiko 3-dan

Kansai Ki-in Prizes for 1981

1. The outstanding player — Hashimoto Shoji

2. The Risen Prize (fighting spirit) — not awarded.


3. The Dogen Prize (special merit — open to players under 9-dan) — Hasegawa Sunao 7-dan



Awaji 8-dan



Kusunoki 6-dan



Hasegawa 7-dan



Honda 9-dan

(won the 7-dan section of the Kisei tournament).

4. The New Face Prize — Imamura Toshiya 4-dan.

Two additional prizes were also awarded:

The Special Prize — to Hashimoto Utaro who at the age of 74 made a comeback to the Honinbo league.

The Prize for Consecutive Wins — Honda Kuni-hisa 9-dan (10 wins in a row)

1981 in Statistics

Top ten prize-winners.

1. Cho Chikun: ¥45,160,000 (approx. \$190,000)
2. Otake Hideo: ¥34,250,000
3. Fujisawa Shuko: ¥31,890,000
4. Kato Masao: ¥29,700,000
5. Takemiya Masaki: ¥16,840,000
6. Kobayashi Koichi: ¥16,490,000
7. Rin Kaiho: ¥15,420,000
8. Sakata Eio: ¥12,260,000
9. Ishida Yoshio: ¥7,520,000
10. Awaji Shuzo: ¥7,400,000

Highest number of wins (over 6-dan)

1. Yamashiro Hiroshi: 38 wins — 10 losses
2. Cho Chikun: 36-10-1 jigo

3. Awaji Shuzo: 35—13
Kobayashi Koichi: 35—17
5. Sato Masaharu 7-dan: 31—21—1
6. Ishida Akira 8-dan: 30—12
7. Rin Kaiho: 29—16
Kato Masao: 29—26
9. Kamimura Kunio 7-dan: 27—11
10. Tokimoto Hajime 7-dan: 26—11
Ishida Yoshio: 26—15

Best winning percentage (over 6-dan)

1. Yamashiro: 79.2%
2. Cho Chikun: 77.7%
3. Awaji: 72.9%
4. Ishida Akira: 71.4%
Takagi Shoichi: 71.4%
6. Kamimura Kunio: 71.1%
7. Tokimoto: 70.3%
8. Kobayashi Koichi: 67.3%
9. Nakamura Shidehito 8-dan: 66.7%
10. Rin Kaiho: 64.4%

1981 Tournament Year

February

5th Kisei Title: Fujisawa defeated Otake 4-0.
13th Haya-go Ch'ship: Sakata beat Kato 2-1.
3rd Kakusei Tournament: Otake (defeated Cho).

March

28th NHK Cup: Fujisawa Shuko (def. Takagi).
3rd Japan Asia Airlines Cup: Otake (def. Sakata).
Nakamura Yutaro promoted to 9-dan.

April

19th Judan Title: Otake defeated Hashimoto Shoji 3-0.
Cho Chikun & Takagi Shoichi promoted to 9-dan.

May

27th Women's Ch'ship: Honda Sachiko 6-dan defeated Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan 2-1.
Hasegawa Sunao won 7-dan Ch'ship, 6th Kisei.
Ishida Akira won 8-dan ch'ship, 6th Kisei.
Japanese group, lead by Hashimoto Shoji, toured China, won 30-26.

June

Shiraishi Yutaka won 9-dan Ch'ship, 6th Kisei.

July

Kobayashi Reiko won 3rd Women's Kakusei tour.
6th Shinjin-O Title: O Rissei defeated Hasegawa Sunao 2-0.
36th Honinbo Title: Cho Chikun defeated Takemiya 2-0.
Shiraishi Yutaka won the Pro-Ama Open go tour.

August

Ishida Akira won the 12th New Stars tournament.
6th Gosei Title: Otake defeated Kato 3-1.

September

Kobayashi Koichi won 2nd Stage, 6th Kisei.
25th P.M.'s Cup: Awaji defeated Kataoka 2-0.

October

6th Meijin: Cho Chikun defeated Kato 4-0.

November

22nd Okan (Crown) Title: Yamashiro Hiroshi defeated Iwata Tatsuaki 1-0.

6th Kisei, 3rd Stage Final: Rin defeated Kobayashi Koichi 2-0.

Hane, Tozawa and Sakai promoted to 9-dan.

December

29th Oza Title: Hashimoto Shoji defeated Kato 2-1.

7th Tengen Title: Kato defeated Kobayashi 3-2.



Kobayashi Reiko, Women's Kakusei Champion

Montreal Honinbo, Ottawa Meijin, Vancouver Open

Osamu Yokota 5-dan has won the Montreal Honinbo title for the 3rd year in a row, defeating the challenger, Louis Leroux 5-dan, 2—0. Leroux had won the Montreal Honinbo League with a 5—0 record. Yuzo Ota (4—1) and Khalid Benabdallah (3—2) retained their places in the league.

Tsuchiya 3-dan defended his Ottawa Meijin title by beating challenger, Ken Song 2-dan, 2—1.

The 1982 Vancouver Open was held on 20-21 March, with 36 players participating. The Aki-moto Memorial Cup was won for the second year in a row by Dr. Sunghwa Hong 5-dan, who defeated Jong Choi 5-dan in the final round. Third place was taken by Dino Cremonese 4-dan.

A new departure in go publishing

THE KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

announces the publication of

INVINCIBLE

THE GAMES OF SHUSAKU

Compiled, edited and translated by John Power

A definitive collection of the best games of one of the greatest go players in history, with detailed commentaries by top modern professional players and a full description of the historical background.

Shusaku (1829 – 62), ‘the invincible’, was the outstanding player in an age of go geniuses. In the annual castle games (O-shiro-go), participation in which was severely restricted to the top players of the day, thus making it the highest honour open to a go player, Shusaku set an unprecedented record of nineteen straight wins over a period of thirteen years, a feat without parallel in the two hundred and fifty year history of the castle games. He was also victorious in every important match he played and, in what was the golden age of go, he firmly established his preeminence. His tragic death at the age of thirty-three was an enormous blow to the go world.

Shusaku also made great contributions to the development of go theory. His famous ‘Shusaku style’ fuseki pattern laid the foundations of modern fuseki theory and is still popular today. In Japan his games are considered exemplary and are required study for all serious students of go. In fact, the first task invariably assigned to would-be professionals or insei is to go through his complete games. Go Seigen is one example of a famous player who studied Shusaku thoroughly in his formative period.

This book gives a unique and detailed insight into the world of nineteenth century Japanese go. Apart from the castle games mentioned above, highlights include:

Shusaku’s precocious triumph over Gennan Inseki, the arch-enemy of the Honinbo house. Their series produced the most famous move in go history, ‘the ear-reddening move of Shusaku’.

All the games from the famous twenty-three game series in which Shusaku finally defeated his main rival, Ota Yuzo.

Shusaku’s games with his teacher, Shuwa, the 14th Honinbo, which contain some of the most interesting and subtle go of the period.

And many others, amounting to eighty games with detailed commentary (Part One), with an additional selection of sixty-two games (Part Two).

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29th Oza Title

After Hashimoto Uтарo, Hashimoto Shoji (no relation) is the main standard-bearer of the Kansai Ki-in. In recent years the Kansai Ki-in has been completely overshadowed by the Nihon Ki-in, but in the last year or so there have been encouraging signs of a resurgence, particularly in the Judan tournament and in the Honinbo and Meijin leagues. Most praiseworthy, perhaps, is the continuing good form of the founder of the Kansai Ki-in, Hashimoto Uтарo, who is still a front line player at the age of seventy-five, surely a unique achievement in the sphere of board games. However, it is probably expecting too much to ask him to take a title at such an advanced age, so the best hope of the Kansai Ki-in for breaking the Tokyo monopoly on the titles remains the younger Hashimoto.

The Oza title match was Hashimoto Shoji's second title challenge during 1981. His attempt to take the Judan title from Otake was soundly rebuffed (see GW25), but his prospects against Kato, considering the latter's recent bad form, seemed much better. Incidentally, Hashimoto won the 7th Oza title in 1960 and this was his first open title.

Game One

White: Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan

Black: Kato Masao, Tengen & Oza

Played on 27 October 1981 at the Fukudaya Inn in Yotsuya, Tokyo.

Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

Commentary by Murakami Akira

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White 4, 6. Switching elsewhere after making the approach move is a very unusual strategy.

White 16 – 24. Setting up a ko so early is also unusual. The proverb tells us that there are no ko threats at the beginning of a game, but Black does answer White 26. Black could finish off the ko with 1 in Dia. 1, but White would secure his group by taking the corner territory with 2 and 4. The △ stone is light, so Black's capture at 1 would not have much effect upon it.

Actually, if Black is going to answer White 26, Black 'a' seems preferable to 27, since the latter requires an additional move later to secure the corner.

White of course ignores the ko threat at 29. The continuation to 41 reverses the balance of power in this corner and seems to give Black sufficient compensation for the ko.

Black 43. This invasion, which aims at making use of Black's thickness at the bottom, is natural. If White had wanted to prevent it, he could have played 42 at 45, but the drawback of that is that it would have given Black a good continuation with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 48.

Black 45 was too peaceful, according to Sakata Eio, the referee for this game. He strongly ad-






Figure 1 (1 – 50)

28: ko



Dia. 1



Dia. 2 8: connects

vocated following Dia. 2.

Dia. 2. If White 2 and 4, Black plays 5, gives atari at 7, then connects at 9. This would keep up the pressure on the white group, so White would have no time to rescue the △ stone; Black

might be able to get a large centre territory. If White plays at 3 instead of 2, the sequence Black 2, White 'a', Black 5 follows; this leaves White with defects in his position, so it would also be better for Black than the sequence in the game.




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

In the result to 57 Black takes profit on the side, but White gets superb central thickness. It seems clear that Black's play here has been too negative.

Black 59 aims at offering some support to the group on the right while strengthening the bottom left corner, but it falls between two stools. Blocking at 69 has priority in this corner.

White 66. If White captures the black stone, Black will poke his head through at 66. Black's clever play with 63 etc. keep him sente here, so he is able to switch to 69. However, after 69 it becomes apparent that 59 is unnecessary. If Black had played 69 first, he would prefer to play next at 'a' on the right or, better still, at 70 in the centre. White's attack at 70 combines well with his thick position on the right.

White 76 is a good move, but if Black played 75 at 'b', White's invasion at 82 would be very severe; if Black extended to 76 instead, White would invade at 'c'.

Hashimoto was dissatisfied with the result after the sequence from 84 to 100 and he spent a lot of time going over it after the game. Apparently, letting Black link up his two weak groups like this was questionable and what had been a promis-

Oza Prizemoney


1st prize: ¥4,700,000

2nd prize: ¥940,000


Match fee - title-holder: ¥1,000,000

challenger: ¥660,000

(¥240=\$1)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

ing position for White now became a difficult one. His conclusion was that White 90 was a slack move. Instead -

Dia. 3. The hane at 1 is more severe. If Black 2, White 3 stops him from connecting. Black can play 4 and 6, but White just has to give way a little. If later Black 'a', White 'b', then Black 'c' starts a difficult fight, but White could compromise with Black 'a', White 'd', Black 'b'. White can aim at attacking the black group at 'e'. This result seems better for White than that in the game.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

When Black links up his groups, the focus of the game switches to the centre right. The outcome will be decided by how much territory White can convert his thickness into.

White 6 is a bad mistake: after Black 7 White has to spend time securing a connection for his three stones at the top. White 6 should have been at 1 in Dia. 4. The best that Black could do would be to counter with 2 to 6.

White 8. Sakata made an interesting suggestion here, to the effect that White should follow Dia. 5.

Dia. 5. White pushes once at 1, then secures his connection with 3 to 7. A kind of exchange would probably follow with the






Figure 3 (101 - 144)



Dia. 5




Dia. 6


sequence Black 'a' through to White 'g', but the result would be reasonable for White.

White 12 shows what a tough position White is in: this move does not work. All Black has to do is to attach at 1 in Dia. 6. If White 2, Black forces with 3, then hanes at 5. If White cuts at 6, Black gives atari at 7, then comes in from below at 9. If White plays at 6 instead of 2, Black 3 and White 'a' follow, leaving Black with the aji of pushing through at 2. Either way White could not expect to make much territory in the centre.

Black 13 lets slip this chance to upset White's ambitions for the centre, but Black's next move is even worse: it loses the game for him.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

When White cuts with 16 to 20, Black loses his two stones outright; in effect, he has lost a move. Even after he has made the mistake with 15, however, it would probably be better to follow Dia. 7 with 17.

Dia. 7. Black 1 permits White 2 to 8, but Black has to grin and bear it. Saving his two stones with 1 means that Black can still reduce White's centre. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 8. White might play the variation here, but Black does not suffer appreciable damage.

Black 21. Black tries to reduce the centre from the other side, but White stops him with 22 and 24. Black gets no compensation for his two lost stones.


White 26. If at 'a', Black can aim at 'b'.

White 28 is a natural counterattack in response to Black 27. White does not want to defend at 1 in Dia. 9. The reason —


Dia. 9. If White 1, Black can play 2 and 4 in sente. If White plays elsewhere, Black can play the sequence to 12. After 12 White has to lose something.

White 30 surprised the players following the game. They had expected White to play at either 31 or 38, but White had the sequence to 38 up his sleeve. This secures life for his group (if Black plays in above 38, White plays 42), so Black 29 turns out to be a dud.

White 44. Attempting to capture Black with 1 in Dia. 10 would be unreasonable. After Black 2 and 4, White would be unable to cover both of his weaknesses at 'a' and 'b'.



Dia. 9 5: elsewhere



Dia. 10




Figure 4 (145 - 180)

Figure 4 (145 - 180)

White 48. If at 'a', Black will extend at 48 and counterattack.

White 50. If White cuts (to the right of 49), Black counters with 'a'.

Black cleverly succeeds in escaping in the sequence from 45 to 53, but he does not recover any of the ground lost from the capture of his two stones (13 and 15).

White 64 puts the finishing touch to a won position. White is able to torment the black group up to 76, a sequence which incidentally makes the invasion at 78 possible.

Black has to resign after White 80. He loses a lot of points on the side if he does not block at 'b', but if he does he has to fight a ko for the life of his group after White 'c', Black 'd'. Note that White cannot play 80 at 'c', as Black counters with 'e', White 'f', Black 'g'.

Hashimoto played moves which could well have lost the game for him (6 and 12 in Figure 3), but an out-of-form Kato was unable to take advantage of them. With luck on his side, Hashimoto got off to a good start in the best-of-three series.

Black resigns after White 180

(*'Kido'*, December 1981)

Game Two

White: Kato Masao

Black: Hashimoto Shoji

Played 9 November 1981 at the Toyo Hotel in Osaka.

Commentary by Kato Masao

Between the first and second games of the Oza title match, Hashimoto lost the Tengen playoff (held on 5 November) to Kobayashi Koichi by half a point. This setback must have been quite a blow, for recently he has done well against Kobayashi (see GW24). His prospects for taking a title were now halved — it was the Oza or nothing.

For his part, Kato came to this encounter sitting on an inglorious losing streak of six games, all of them important ones. The contrast to the Kato of a couple of years ago, when he held four big titles, could not have been greater. He needed a win in this game very badly.




Figure 1 (1 - 44)

Figure 1 (1 - 44)


Black 1, 3, 5. Hashimoto's favourite fuseki with black.

Black 19 works well with the backing of Black's position in the bottom right corner. White, however, accepts the challenge by playing the standard version of the taisha (instead of avoiding it with 20 at 22 or 26 at 29) despite the fact that he ends up moving in the direction of Black's strong position with 26 and 32.


White 32. Hashimoto Utaro, the referee, suggested playing 32 at 'a'. He also advocated playing 33 at 'b'. These comments illustrate Utaro's youthful fighting spirit: he hates to play what the opponent is expecting.

Black 33 is the joseki move, but what happens if Black does play at 'b'?

Dia. 1. If Black 1, White will play 2 and 4. Black plays 5, then cuts at 7, sacrificing two



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

stones in order to squeeze. After Black 17, White will cut at 18, starting a very difficult fight. If Black plays 'a' instead of 7, White 'b' and Black 'c' follow; White then plays 'd' and keeps pushing down, getting a reasonable result.

White 34. White cannot afford to stick to the joseki with 'c': Black 34 would be too severe.

Black 35. Kato expected Black to attack with 1 in Dia. 2. He intended to counter with 2 and 4, then switch to 6. If White omitted 2 and 4, Black 'a' would be very severe.

White 42. Getting in this move on top of 34 means that White can relax. Instead of coming under pressure, he has ended up getting a comfortable position inside Black's sphere of influence.

Black 43. Black could attack the white group by building thickness with Black 44, White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', then capping at 'g', but he would have little prospect of success. All the same, White prefers to link up his groups with 44 to 50 in the next figure.

Figure 2 (45 – 85)

Black 45. Black cannot jump to 1 in Dia. 3 as White gets a beautiful squeeze with the sacrifice sequence to 14.

White 52. White could answer the peep at 1 in Dia. 4, but then he would lose sente, so Black would be able to switch to 'a' in the figure.

Black 55. Black links up at the bottom, but White is satisfied with getting sente to play 56. Black's territory is not as large as it appears, as







Figure 2 (45 – 85)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

White can later play the endgame sequence shown in Dia. 5 (if Black 8 at 10, White 'a' becomes sente).

Black 59. Black could also cut at 60, but it does not seem worthwhile: White would get superb shape with 'b'.

White 68 is a dubious move. It might be better to play at 1 in Dia. 6 (next page) in order to prevent Black from getting a base on the side. If

Black 2, White continues his attack with 3. If Black plays 2 at 3, White counterattacks at 'a'. Letting Black secure his group with 69 to 73 is a little unsatisfactory, though White does get the chance to attack at the vital point of 74 on the left side.



Dia. 6

Dia. 8




Figure 3 (86 - 134)

Figure 3 (86 - 134)

White 92 is a patient move. White 112 at the top would be a superb move, but Black 92 would not only threaten the white group on the right side but would also make it difficult for White to get much territory at the top.

White 96. White strengthens himself at the expense of losing the sequence in Dia. 5.


Black 113, 115. Well-timed — later Black can live in the corner.

White 124. Kato had his doubts about this move: White cannot secure definite life in the corner, since Black can get a ko by playing Dia. 7. Kato felt that playing the sequence in Dia. 8 might have been better.

White 134. White resists the temptation to attach at 1 in Dia. 9.

Dia. 9. If White 1, Black counters with 2, to which White has no effective answer. If White descends at 3, Black plays 4 to 12. White is helpless —

Dia. 10. If he continues with 1, Black squeezes him with the famous 'seki-to' (stone tower) sacrifice tesuji and wins the semeai after 10. The patient move of 134 in the figure is therefore best.



Dia. 9

*Dia. 10 4: throws in
5: captures; 7: connects*






Figure 4 (135 - 180)

Figure 4 (135 - 180)

Black 35 is big, but this was Black's ideal opportunity to start the ko in Dia. 7. Even if he did not win the ko itself, he would be certain of taking some profit in the fight, which would



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

give him a good chance of winning the game. Hashimoto confessed after the game that he had miscalculated the territorial balance. Presumably he had thought that he did not need the ko to win.

White 38 makes the position very close: the game will be decided in the endgame.

Black 39 is a good move played at the wrong time. The idea of 39 is that —


Dia. 11. White cannot block at 1 because of Black 2. If White connects at 5, Black cuts at 6. After Black 12, White cannot stop Black from linking up — if White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', then Black 'd' — so White's large group perishes.

In itself, Black 39 is a clever move, but it has the unfortunate effect of provoking White 42 to 46, a very large endgame sequence. Instead of 39 —


Dia. 12. Black should descend at 1, then hane at 3. White answers 1 at 2 as White 'a' would be too submissive.

Black 49 completes the damage done by 35 and 39 and makes the game lost for Black. Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 13 are bigger and might, perhaps, give Black a very small lead. Playing 49 is not urgent — see Dia. 14.

Dia. 14. If White attaches at 1, Black resists with the clamp we saw earlier. If White 3, Black has the 4—6 combination. If next White 'a', White



Dia. 13



Dia. 14




Figure 5 (181 - 229)

loses his stones at the top after Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

White 64 sets the seal on victory; it also makes 70 possible.

Figure 5 (181 - 229)

Kato won this game because of his patient play. In Figure 2 the game became a little favourable for Hashimoto, but he did not obtain a decisive advantage. In the endgame his play lacked precision, and Kato was able to upset his lead. Kato's play was not brilliant, but he must have been very pleased at putting an end to his dismal losing streak.

White wins by 3½ points.

(*'Kido'*, January 1981)



Profile of Hashimoto Shoji

Hashimoto was born on 27 February 1935 in Taiwan. He learnt go in 1944 from his father Kunisaburo 6-dan, then a go teacher in Japanese-occupied Taiwan. He became professional shodan in 1947, then began setting speed promotion records. He reached 9-dan at the age of 23, which still stands as a record. Hashimoto won the 7th

Oza title (1960), the 14th (1967) and 27th (1980) NHK Cups, the 12th Judan title in 1974 (defeating Sakata 3-1) and the 7th Haya-go Championship (1975). He also won the Second Stage (all-dan championship) of the 4th Kisei tournament. He challenged unsuccessfully for the 17th and 19th Judan titles and has won the Kansai Ki-in Number One Position title ten times. This Oza title is his fourth major open title.

Last year Hashimoto led the Japanese group which toured China and overwhelmed the local opposition, winning all seven of his games (in the overall results the Japanese side won 30-26).

Hashimoto is a frequent member of the Meijin and Honinbo leagues and usually gets quite good results against Nihon Ki-in players (his record against Kato stands at 10-6 after the Oza match). His go is tenacious and aggressive and his games are always complicated. He used to be notorious for spending the bulk of his time allowance on the early fuseki, but recently he has made an effort to speed up his game.

Game Three

White: Hashimoto Shoji

Black: Kato Masao

Played on 7 December 1981 at the Nihon Ki-in

Commentary by Hashimoto Shoji

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White's strategy is to counter Black's two corner enclosures with the extensions of 6 and 8. He holds back one space with 8 in deference to the higher location of 7.

White 10. It's difficult to choose between 10 and 30, but on reflection it seems that 30 is the correct move. If Black answered at 'a', White 25 would make nice balance with 6. Black might choose to answer White 30 at 'b', in which case White 24 and Black 21 would follow.

White 12. White 'c' would make bad balance with 8 and would give Black a good continuation at 15.

White 18. If at 'd', extending to 18 would be good for Black.

Black 21. Hashimoto felt grateful for this move. The usual move is 1 in Dia. 1, followed by 3. If White next invades at 'a', Black gets a strong shape with 'b'.

Black 27. Black could also exchange 'e' for White 'f' first. White 28 could also be at 'e'.







Figure 1 (1 - 50)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2




Dia. 3


Black 31 is the instinctive move, but the result is unsatisfactory. Black 1 in Dia. 2 does not work well (White gets too much territory), but Hashimoto expected 1 in Dia. 3. The continuation White 'a' - Black 4 would be bad for White, so he would probably play 2, but Black would be able to resist with 3 to 9. Just how Black should move out next is, admittedly, a difficult problem. Instead of 5,



Dia. 4



Dia. 6



Dia. 5

Black could also play at 'b'; in response White could either resist with 8 or compromise with 5.

Black 37 aims at making a furikawari (trade), but cutting at 'g' would after all have been stronger. The subsequent fighting would be very difficult and it is very hard to reach any conclusions about what would happen, but some possibilities are shown in Dias. 4 to 6.

Dia. 4. First, the sequence to 8 could be hypothesized. Blocking at 9 next is a very stubborn move. The continuation to 21 can be considered unsatisfactory for White. Instead of 10 —

Dia. 5. White could also play 10 and 12 here, then switch to 14, aiming at the ladder set up by cutting below 15. Black would defend at 15, so White could break through Black's corner with 16. However, this variation is not so appealing because White seems to be fleeing from the fight in the bottom left corner.

Dia. 6. Instead of 10 in Dia. 4, White could follow a sacrifice strategy with 1 and 3. Cutting at 5 creates a bit of aji. After Black 8 White would attach at 'h' in the figure in order to expand his

moyo on the left side. This diagram could be quite an effective strategy.


In any case, the point is that White has no decisive attack here, so Black should have played more aggressively and cut at 'g'.

White 38. If White pushes up at 42, Black 'g' becomes more effective.


White 40. Hashimoto felt that he had profited a little in this exchange.

Black 41. Black has to take compensation here for his loss at the bottom.

White 42 may be a little heavy. Lighter would be White 1 in Dia. 7; if Black 2, White plays 3, then switches to 5. However, Hashimoto commented that this kind of light-footed play does not suit him.




Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Black 45. Black 1 in Dia. 8 is also possible. The simple response for White is to make a trade with 2 etc. If Black plays 5 at 6, White makes good shape with 7. White could also play 2 at 'a'; a difficult fight would follow with Black 4, White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 48. This solid connection is cautious. The usual move is the diagonal connection of 1 in Dia. 9, but White is worried that Black might cut at 2. White 5 to 9 are a straightforward way to settle the group, but White dislikes the prospect of a peep at 10. Even so, White would be able to secure his group with 13 to 19, so following this



Dia. 9




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

diagram would be possible. The most aggressive way for White to play would be to extend to 9 with 5, but then Black 7 would start a difficult fight.

White 50 is too heavy; taking up position with 'i' would be simpler.

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

White 52. Another tesuji for sabaki is shown on Dia. 10.

White 58. If White 1 in Dia. 11, Black will extend at 2. White can create some aji in the corner with 3 etc., but it doesn't amount to anything. The cut at 'a' looks worrying - if Black 'b', White strikes at 'c' - but simply answering at 'd' squelches it.

When Black cuts at 65, it looks as if White's position is going to crumble, but White keeps the main body of his force out of danger by discarding two stones.

White 70. White 'a' is also possible.

White 76 makes miai of 'b' and 80.


Black 83. Attacking with 1 etc. in Dia. 12 seems preferable. Up to 7 Black gets a nice attack going. If White 4 at 'a', Black gains momentum with 'b'.

Black 87. Black 'c' would also be big.


Black 89. Black could have launched an all-or-nothing attack with 'd', but Hashimoto was confident that he could have handled the fight following White 'e'.

Black 93. Playing the forcing move of Black 96 would clearly be superior.


Black 99. In this case the crosscut tesuji of 1 in Dia. 13 would not worry White. Even though Black can split White into two up to 7, the en-




Dia. 10




Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

suing fight looks more favourable for White. Note that if Black plays 3 at 'a', White will still capture at 4.

Figure 3 (101 - 140)

White 2. This result is satisfactory for White.





Figure 3 (101 - 140)



Dia. 15

Black has not gained anything by playing 97 and 99 in the previous figure.

White 8. Necessary — see Dia. 14.

Black 15 is bigger than it looks. If omitted, White can force with 1 to 5 in Dia. 15. If next Black 'a', then White 'b' is sente.

Black 27. Black should first play at 'a', forcing White 'b'. White is able to make ideal shape with 30 and 32. When Hashimoto played the latter move, he felt confident for the first time that he had won. White seems to be ahead by two or three points on the board.

Kato resigned early, at White 140. He had made no really bad move, but his play lacked its usual sharp edge. Perhaps he was fatigued by the constant grind of tournament play and had lost his fighting spirit.

A final detail — White does not have to add a reinforcement in his position at the bottom left. If Black plays 1 in Dia. 16, White wins the semeai, with one eye to Black's none (me-ari me-nashi).

Black resigns after White 140.

This title was Hashimoto's fourth major title. 'Kido' magazine interviewed him after the final game and excerpts are given below.

Kido: Congratulations. How many years is it since you last won the Oza?


H. S.: Twenty-two years. I played Yamabe in the title match. After that I twice became the challenger, meeting Sakata and Shuko. There was a game I lost to Shuko by half a point.

Kido: Looking back over the match, what are your impressions?

H. S.: The games were all difficult; I really got exhausted.

Kido: Your fuseki with white in the first and third games caused quite a lot of discussion.

H. S.: Neither game was my first experiment. At heart I don't like playing stereotyped patterns, but trying something new in an important game takes a lot of nerve.



Dia. 16

Kido: Is it just coincidence that White won all the games in this match?

H. S.: It's strange, but when I play with Kato I often win with White and lose with black. But I should have won that second game with black. I miscounted the score.

Kido: What did you think of Kato's form?

H. S.: I guess he did seem a little tired. He had the Tengen match too.

Kido: You're a dozen years older than Kato, but you weren't outmatched in stamina.

H. S.: My stamina is still OK — until I'm fifty...

(*'Kido'*, February 1982. Translated by the editor.)

Oza Title-holders

The Oza title is sponsored by Nihon Keizai Shimbun. The first title match was a one-game playoff, the second to fifteenth titles were three-game playoffs, then it switched to the challenger system. It ranks sixth in prestige of the seven major open titles (after Kisei, Meijin, Honinbo, Judan, and Tengen, and preceding the Gosei).

- 1 (1953). Hashimoto Uтарo (defeated Maeda)
- 2 (1954). Takagawa Shukaku (d. Miyashita 2–1)
- 3 (1955). Hashimoto U. (d. Shimamura 2–1)
- 4 (1956). Hashimoto U. (d. Sakata 2–0)
- 5 (1957). Shimamura (d. Handa Dogen 2–0)
- 6 (1958). Fujisawa Hosai (d. Handa 2–0)
- 7 (1959). Hashimoto Shoji (d. Yamabe 2–0)
- 8 (1960). Handa Dogen (d. Miyashita 2–0)
- 9 (1961). Sakata Eio (d. Takagawa 2–1)
- 10 (1962). Miyashita (d. Kada Katsuji 2–0)
- 11 (1963). Sakata (d. Fujisawa Hosai 2–0)
- 12 (1964). Sakata (d. Kajiwarra 2–0)
- 13 (1965). Handa Dogen (d. Okubo 2–0)
- 14 (1966). Sakata (d. Rin Kaiho 2–1)
- 15 (1967). Fujisawa Shuko (d. Hashimoto S. 2–0)
- 16 (1968). Fujisawa Shuko (d. Sakata 2–0)
- 17 (1969). Fujisawa Shuko (d. Otake 2–0)
- 18 (1970). Sakata (d. Fujisawa Shuko 2–0)
- 19 (1971). Sakata (d. Hashimoto Shoji 2–0)
- 20 (1972). Sakata (d. Hashimoto Uтарo 2–1)
- 21 (1973). Rin Kaiho (d. Sakata 2–1)
- 22 (1974). Ishida Yoshio (d. Rin 2–1)
- 23 (1975). Otake Hideo (d. Ishida 2–0)
- 24 (1976). Cho Chikun (d. Otake 2–1)
- 25 (1977). Kudo Norio (d. Cho 2–0)
- 26 (1978). Ishida (d. Kudo 2–1)
- 27 (1979). Kato (d. Ishida 2–0)
- 28 (1980). Kato (d. Ishida 2–0)
- 29 (1981). Hashimoto Shoji (d. Kato 2–1)

Go in Korea

Go is just as active in Korea as in Japan. The Korean Go Association (the Hanguk Kiwon) currently has about 80 professional players, seven regular tournaments are sponsored by newspapers, and various lightning tournaments are carried on television. This issue we are featuring a confrontation between the two leading rivals of Korean go, Cho Hoon-hyun 8-dan and Su Bong-suh 7-dan. The game is the fourth game of the 1981 best-of-five National Champion title match, in which Su was the challenger, and after a come-from-behind victory in the third game, Cho was leading the series 2-1. The commentary is by Cho Chikun, the Japanese Honinbo and Meijin.

Black: Cho Hoon-hyun 8-dan

White: Su Bong-suh 7-dan

Komi: 5½; 30 November 1981





Figure 1 (1 - 34)

Figure 1 (1 - 34)

The opening of this game, in which the two sides traded blows in the upper left and right corners with the two bottom corners still empty, follows a pattern that has been tried in the past. The idea behind Black 7 is that if Black answers White 6 directly at 11, since the joseki in the top right ends in White's sente, White will follow it with a diagonal move at 7. Apparently Cho disliked that.




Dia. 1


White had the option of ignoring Black 7 and playing for an exchange with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. As a variation in that diagram, Black can play 2 at 3, followed by White 'a', then Black 2. A lot of choices could be considered at this point in the game, and it would be hard to say objectively which is best. What matters is how the player carries on afterwards.

White 24 in the bottom right corner was a big move, but White 26 was a departure from normal strategy, which would probably be to defend the right side with 'a' or 'b'. Su then gave us a taste of his style with the stubborn move at White 28. This move, however, tends to lead to complications. The standard choice for White 28 is 1 in Dia. 2. Perhaps Su rejected that joseki because it nullifies the white thickness in the top right. Dia. 3 also looks playable, but Su must have felt that it was too easygoing.

Black 29 took the severe approach. The peaceful way to play is Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 31, Black 'f'.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (35 - 73)

Figure 2 (35 - 73)

White 38 was territorially oriented, but White was risking trouble by spreading himself so thinly. A jump to 'a' or a surrounding move at 57 on the right side would have been correct. Black made a good response at 39.

The sequence in which White forced at 46 then captured a stone with 48 and 50 had a curious effect on the course of the game. Locally, White can omit these moves; if Black connects at 1 in Dia. 4, White lives with 2 and 4. However,



Dia. 4


since Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' can be visualized in the top left, Dia. 4 has the drawback of leaving White in a low position all up and down the left side. White 46 to 50 can be seen as a natural way to avoid that low posture, but unfortunately they drew White into playing 52 next.

White would never have made this move in Dia. 4, since it would play directly toward Black's thickness.


The trouble with the 52-53 exchange is that it weakened White's position in the lower right part of the board. If White had played 52 at 57, the game would have been even, with White watching for a chance to play White 53, Black 'b', White 'c', Black 52, White 'd' or some similar sequence. True, Black might resist by answering White 53 at 'e', but in any case White 52 went in the opposite of the desired direction.

At 54, White should again have played 57. One can picture Black 'f', White 'g', Black 'h', White 'i' in reply.

Black 55 was big. It would be one thing if White could capture Black by playing 56 at 1 in Dia. 5, but the sequence through 10 there does not appear to work. Moving White 5 to



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White 1 in Dia. 6 gains a ko, but Black has three ko threats, starting with 'j' in the top left, and comes out ahead if White exchanges.

White 56 therefore could not be helped, but extending to 57 gave Black a sure lead. White had no choice but to try to upset it by attacking with 58.

Black 69 and 71 cut through White's weak spot, and 73 put Black in complete command of the game. At this point one appreciates how much better it would have been not to have made the 52-53 exchange. Pushing through and cutting with White 'k', Black 'l', White 'm' is futile. Black continues with Black 'n', White 'o', Black 'p', White 'q', Black 'r', and White cannot

win the capturing race.





Figure 3 (74 - 100)

Figure 3 (74 - 100)

Having taken the lead, Cho now defended it solidly. Black 75 and 79 coordinated with his framework above, while White was forced to run on neutral ground. Black 83 crowned this sequence by converting the framework into territory.

White 100 was the deepest White could go in. If White tried something like 1 and 3 in Dia. 7, he would be 99% sure to die, considering that this was a professional game. Had he attempted to penetrate from the center even one line farther than 100, Black would have capped him and killed the invasion. Reducing at the 100 line, however, seems equally hopeless. It leaves Black with too much territory at the top.



Dia. 7




Figure 4 (101 - 150)




Figure 5 (151 - 225)

115: connects. Black wins the final ko above 111.

Figures 4 and 5 (101 - 225)

There is nothing special to say about the rest of the game. Black won by $5\frac{1}{2}$ points, and one suspects that he did so by playing safe and compromising, although I would have to examine the endgame more carefully to be sure. Cho put on an expert performance in this game, seizing on some small white mistakes and finding exactly the right way to convert them into victory. He has now held the National Champion title for six consecutive years.

Black wins by $5\frac{1}{2}$ points.

('Igo', April 1982. Translated by J. Davies)

7th Tengen Title

The Tengen was the final match of the 1981 tournament year and, like so many other tournaments these days, it matched two leading players of the Kitani school. Kato has been a fixture in the tournament scene for half a decade, but this was only the second appearance of Kobayashi Koichi in a major title match, although he has won a string of minor titles. Ten years ago Kobayashi was hailed as a rising star and it was predicted that he would go on to do great things, but so far he has curiously failed to realize his full potential. This is in great contrast to his youthful rival, Cho Chikun, who made his debut about the same time. Kobayashi Koichi clearly has the talent to take some major titles, but he has lacked the ability or the luck to win the right games at the right time. This may finally be changing. His record in 1980 was a superb 32 wins to 15 losses and last year 35–17. 1982 is shaping up as his best year yet, for winning the Honinbo league gives him a chance at one of the top three titles.

Last year Kobayashi came close to success but just missed out on the major prizes. He lost the Oza playoff to Hashimoto Shoji, then was defeated 2–0 by Rin in the Kisei playoff. That meant that his last chance was the Tengen title match, in which he faced an out-of-form Kato who was under the additional strain of defending his Oza title against Hashimoto at the same time.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Black: Kato Masao, Tengen & Oza

Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

Played on 25 November 1981 in Hyuga City, Miyazaki Prefecture, Kyushu

Commentary by Kato Masao

This is the first title game to be played in Hyuga City, which has long been famous as the source of high-quality clam shell stones and kaya (Torreya nucifera or Japanese nutmeg, the wood used for the best go boards). The local supply has been virtually exhausted, but manufacturing go equipment is still the main industry of the town, though now it has to rely on imported clam shells and wood. The clam shell stones provided for this game were the real thing, however: they were valued at over \$40,000.

Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Black 7. Ishida Yoshio, the referee, commented that pressing at 7 instead of jumping to 11 is very unusual in this fuseki.

Black 17. Capping at 18 is also possible.

Black 19. Once again capping, this time at 20, is possible. White 20 gives a leisurely game.

White 22. Invading is essential after Black 21.

Black 25 is the only move. In this case the hane at 1 in Dia. 1 is not good. After the usual sequence to 9, White will counter with 10 instead of connecting at 3. If Black takes the ko, White extends at 'a', but if Black connects at 'b', White





Figure 1 (1 – 40)



Dia. 1

links up with 'c'.

Black 35. Black will decide later whether to block at 'a' or to hane at 'b'.

White 38 is very unusual: the set move here is

'c'. Kobayashi: 'If White 'c', Black will play at 'd'. I didn't want that. In the old games they always played 38.'

Kato: 'White 38 is certainly tight territorially. It might be possible.'




Figure 2 (41 - 90)

Figure 2 (41 - 90)

Black 45 defends against an invasion at 'a', but it has the drawback of solidifying White's corner. Kato commented later that perhaps he should simply have jumped to 'b'; if White 49, Black would patiently defend at 51. Black 'b' would offer support to Black 41.

White 52. Ishida had his doubts about this move. He would have preferred to connect solidly at 1 in Dia. 2, as White could then continue with 3 and 5, thus putting more pressure on the ▲ stone. Black's position would still be thin even after jumping to 6. Kato agreed completely with this comment.


White 56—Black 57. An exchange which came in for a lot of discussion after the game. Kobayashi's aim with 56 was to follow up by attacking at 58, but it was felt that jumping to 57 was more important. If White played 57, he would be able to aim at attacking the two black stones above and at invading at 'c' or 'd' at the bottom. Black 57 kills two birds with one stone, expanding (and strengthening) the bottom area and offering support to the two black stones above.

Black 59 was the fighting answer to 58, but it was just the move Kobayashi was hoping for. Black now got into serious trouble. Instead of 59, Black should have blocked at 1 in Dia. 3.




Kobayashi Koichi

Born 10 September 1952 in Hokkaido. Entered the Kitani school in 1965, became shodan in 1967, reached 9-dan in 1979. Twice won the New Stars title, the Haya-go Championship and the Shinjin-O title, won the Prime Minister's Cup three times, also won the 2nd Tengen title (his only major title to date), won the 7-dan Ch'ship in 1st Kisei. Was a member of the 33rd, 34th, 35th and 37th Honinbo leagues and the 5th, 6th and 7th Meijin leagues. Kobayashi is married to the daughter of Kitani Minoru, Reiko 6-dan. Kobayashi's career results against Kato are bad, being 3-10 prior to this match.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. If White 2, Black can settle his group up to 7. White's next move would be difficult, for once Black lives the thinness of White's position becomes apparent. If White reinforces with 'a', Black links up with 'b' and has no weak groups. If White attacks first with 8 and 10, the tables are turned when Black counters with 15.




Figure 3 (91 - 126)

Figure 3 (91 - 126)

White 96. Kato was alarmed when he saw Kobayashi descend here, for he had been counting on his sente hane at 96. He commented that he should have played 91 at 96, but Kobayashi countered that he might not have answered. If he attacked at 'a' instead, the position would become complicated.

Black 97. Black 111 would be tighter, but it might not be enough.

White 98 was the only move in this game that Kobayashi regretted, for he played it without reading it out properly. White should play 100 first, that is, 1 in Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. If Black answers at 2, White can play 3 to 9 in sente. If next White 11, the black group would have a very hard time living. According to Kato —

Dia. 5. Black would have to peep at 2 as a make-shift, then play 4. White would attack with 5 etc., but Black would just barely live with the sequence to 12. However, White could then return to defend at 15, for a result clearly superior to that in the figure. The ponnuki of 9 makes the white group so secure that he can invade deeply at 17.


Black 101 and 103 reverse the flow of the game. White's large group remains insecure, so he is unable to do anything about Black's moyo at the bottom.

Black 121 is a mistake: Black's corner has very bad aji after White 114, and Black 121 is meant to eliminate that aji, but it only makes it worse. Instead of 121, Black should guarantee life for


Tengen Titleholders

The Tengen tournament is sponsored by a group of three newspaper companies (the best known publication is the Tokyo Newspaper). For the first five terms the title was decided by a best-of-five final, but from the 6th term the tournament switched to the challenger system (with the 5th Tengen, Kato, meeting a challenger in the 6th Tengen title match).


- 1 (1975). Fujisawa Shuko (defeated Ohira 3-1)
- 2 (1976). Kobayashi Koichi (d. Sugiuchi 3-1)
- 3 (1977). Shimamura Toshihiro (d. Sonoda 3-1)
- 4 (1978). Kato (d. Fujisawa Shuko 3-1)
- 5 (1979). Kato (d. Kataoka 3-0)
- 6 (1980). Kato (d. Yamabe 3-0)
- 7 (1981). Kato (d. Kobayashi 3-2)



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


his other group with 1 in Dia. 6. If White 2, Black cannot intercept at 8 (he would be killed by White 'a'), but he can live with 3 to 9. Once Black plays 121 in the figure —

Dia. 7 (next page). White can set up a ko with 1 to 13 (perhaps Kato overlooked White 9).


Kato woke up to his mistake after playing 121, but fortunately for him the danger was not immediate. To begin with, Black has one good ko threat at 'a' in the diagram; secondly, he could ignore most ko threats and finish off the ko with

Black 'b' and 'c', for next Black could launch a fierce attack on White with Black 'f'—White 'g'—Black 'h', preceded by the Black 'd'—White 'e' exchange. The conclusion is that White has to be very careful about when he starts this ko.

White 126. White's aim is to create ko threats.



Dia. 7
8: connects



Game Two

White: Kato Masao

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 3 December 1981 in Sapporo

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan





Figure 1 (1 – 34)

Figure 1 (1 – 34). A planned fuseki

Black 9. Black 1 to 7 and the pincer at 9 seem to be a fuseki worked out by Kobayashi.

Black 21. The joseki move is at 'a'. Presumably Black does not want to leave White the invasion at 'c' to aim at after White 'b' (the joseki move after Black 'a'). Because Black 7 is already on the board, defending against the invasion would make Black's position overconcentrated.

White 22. If White extends at 1 in Dia. 1, Black can keep White out of the center by wedging in at 2. If White switches 5 to 'a', he loses the fight after Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 5. In the result up to White 26, Black 21 and White 22 are both bad moves that roughly cancel each other.



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (35 – 59). A superb attachment by Black

Black 35—White 38. Black 35 is an unusual move, but in this game it is just right. White has no choice but to give way at 36, then challenge Black to a fight by blocking at 38. If he






Figure 2 (35 – 59)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

13: connects


blocks at 1 in Dia. 2, Black will crosscut at 2. If White then plays atari and connects, Black will be satisfied with the exchange through 14. If White plays 3 and 5 in Dia. 3 instead, Black quickly settles his group and neutralizes White's central influence.

Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 4 are often seen in this position, but in this game White can make effective use of his thickness by resisting with 4 and 6.

Black 41. If at 'a', White can ruin Black's eye-shape by cutting at 41 and squeezing after escaping with White 46.

White 48. Kato regretted this move, saying it had to be at 'b'.

Black 51—Black 59. A nice sequence for Black—it builds thickness and also provides some support for his weak center stones.



Dia. 4





Figure 3 (60 - 100)


Figure 3 (60 - 100). *Kato goes astray.*

White 60. A slack move because it has no good follow-up. The conclusion reached in the after-game discussion was that the knight's move in Dia. 5 was best, since it makes miai out of invading the right and attacking on the left. If Black defends his group with Black 2, White can invade at 3, but if he defends the right with Black 4 White can set the stage for attacking Black by leaning on him with the White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' sequence. Note that White 1 at 'd' does not work because Black 'e', threatening to cut across at 'f', is sente. Since White has to answer at 'g', the pressure is off the black group.



Dia. 5

White 62. Attaching against Black 61 was also criticized because it tries to make territory out of thickness. More like Kato's usual severe at-



Dia. 6

tacking style would be White 1 in Dia. 6. Black would be forced to strengthen his position up to 8, after which White could strike at the center. Although finding the right combination is difficult — Kato gave this as the reason for playing as he did — White 9 and 11 are one possibility. Black would then have to scramble for life with moves like 14, 16, and 18. White 62 is the kind of move played when one is willing to settle for a drawn-out campaign.

White 66. Another doubtful move. Instead of allowing Black to force White with Black 67, White should immediately play 68, forcing Black to answer at 67 to protect against a white invasion at 'a'. White could then switch to White 72 for a much better result than in the game, where Black 69 and 71 are perfect. White's attack has completely fizzled, and a measure of his failure is that Black will be able to scoop out territory in the corner on a grand scale without weakening his center group.

White 96. The hane aims at the thinness of the black group, but, since he can live at 'b', Black is able to switch to 97. White could have made the game closer by invading at the three-three point, but he would still seem to have little chance of winning because of his mistakes beginning with White 60.

Figure 4 (101 - 151). *White is unable to pull anything off.*

Black 9. Black's lead is secure enough to allow him to back off.

Black 11. Ensures life for the center group.

Black 15. Only the yose remains.

White 48. Induces Black 49 and is an attempt





Figure 4 (101 - 151)

to create confusion. Black has read out that his center group is safe, so he makes the strongest reply. His lead increases a little.



Dia. 7

Dia. 8




Figure 5 (152 - 201)

Figure 5 (152 - 201). *The series is tied.*

White 56. If at 1 in Dia. 7, Black lives when 'a' and 'b' become miai after the sequence to 10. White also lives easily after White 1 in Dia. 8.

Black 101. White is $3\frac{1}{2}$ or $4\frac{1}{2}$ points behind when he resigns.

('Kido', January 1982. Translated by David Thayer.)

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Koichi


Black: Kato Masao

Played on 10 December 1981 in Gifu

Figure 1 (1 - 52). *Kato plays san-ren-sei.*

Black 25. Black finds a crack in White's position and starts a fight at close quarters.

Black 33. A ladder block which aims at pushing through and cutting with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. Without the ladder block, the ladder at 'a' and 'b' become miai for White after White 8. Tsuchida 9-dan, who was giving the public commentary in Gifu, said that Black could also consider playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 without the ladder block, then continue with 5 at 7.



Dia. 1

Black could also consider playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 without the ladder block, then continue with 5 at 7.

Black 41. Kato regretted this move, saying he should have jumped to 48. White 46 and 48 are severe; Black suddenly finds the going tough.




Figure 1 (1 - 52)





Figure 2 (53 - 96)

Figure 2 (53 - 96). Does White miss a chance?

Black 53, Black 55. Black decides to fight it out, even though he knows he will come under a double attack.

White 62. The conclusion reached in the after-game discussion was that pulling back at 1 in Dia. 2 would have put White more definitely in the lead. After Black 2, White should leave the top as it is and take a large profit on the left with the sequence to White 9. If White answered Black 2 at 'a', Black would cut at 'b' and be able to squeeze in sente. After ensuring the safety of his stones at the top, he could then block at 'c'.



Dia. 2

White 64 - White 66. The ponnuki makes White very thick, but Black 65 is also an excellent point. Black stays in the game.

White 82, White 84. White moves into the center after leaving some aji behind on the side. The judgment of the professionals following the game was that White was ahead.

Black 85. Black tries to stir up trouble in the corner. The sequence from 'a' to 'd' would

give a close game, but perhaps Kato thought that his prospects were not very good.

White 86. Apparently Kobayashi had already been aiming at this tesuji, since he only spent nine minutes on it.

White 94. Kobayashi thought that this cut would end the game with a single blow, an opinion Kato shared, but the conclusion after the game was that the black group could not be killed.




Figure 3 (97 - 131)

Figure 3 (97 - 131). A complicated life and death problem.

White 100. A fierce attack. Since White cannot kill Black, however, he should attack more slowly after first making the exchange from 'a' to 'f' (which makes White 'g' sente) or exchanging White 124 for Black 125. A more moderate attack should still keep his lead secure.

White 102. Cannot be at 103 or 107 because of Black 102.

Black 105, Black 107. Kato seems to have read out that he can save his stones.

Black 111 - Black 117. The moves to Black 117 make miai out of Black 119 and 'h'. If White connects under at the top with White 114, Black seems to be ahead in the semeai on the side after Black 'h' - White 'i' - Black 'j' - White 118 - Black 'k'.

Black 123. The clamp is a tesuji and decides the issue.

White 128, White 130. White sets up a ko, but his cause is hopeless.

White resigns after Black 131.

('Igo Club', February 1982. Translated by David Thayer.)

Game Four

White: Kato Masao

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played 21 December 1981 at the Nihon Ki-in

Commentary by Ohira Shuzo 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Black 21. Kobayashi follows the standard joseki, in contrast to the second game.

White 22. The joseki move is 'a', but 22 makes the threat of the invasion at 'b' more severe. If White 'a', Black would probably play 'c'.

Black 27. Kobayashi wanted to peep at 'd', but he restrained himself because of the likelihood of a counterattack at 'e'.

Black 29. If at 30, White would play 'f'; if then Black 'g', White would give way with 'h'. If instead Black plays 29 at 'i', White would take the initiative with 'j', Black 'k', White 'l'.

Black 31 starts the action early. White 32 is the strongest answer.

Figure 2 (41 – 100)

Black 43. Black must cut. He could live in sente with 1 in Dia. 1, but White 'a' would be sente and White would get formidable outside thickness.

Black 45. In itself a bad loss of points, but played to create threats for the coming ko fight.

The continuation to 68 seems to be inevitable. Kobayashi was satisfied with the result, but most professionals felt that White had got the better of the ko fight. The main reason for this was the point-losing moves at 45 and 63 that Black had to






Figure 2 (2 (41 – 100)

60: connects; 65: ko



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

play to win the ko.

White 72. White should play at 73. Kato was needlessly worried about Black's two-step hane (Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c').

White 84 lacks severity — perhaps Kato slackened off a little because he felt that he had taken the lead in the ko fight at the bottom left. Takemiya suggested building central thickness by attacking with 1 etc. in Dia. 2.

Black 95. Capping at 97 is the instinctive move, but White might counterattack at 'd'. However, there are other possibilities for 95 — for example, Black 'e' and 'f'.




Figure 3 (101 – 160)

Figure 3 (101 – 160)

White 24. White 26—Black 25—White 27 would be more usual and would make it easier for White to get territory in the centre.

Black 37. Black should extend at 38.

Black 41. Necessary to forestall White 'a'.

White 42. The losing move — White should give atari at 45 (Black would block at 'b' instead of connecting). Black plays 43 etc. in sente, then returns to defend at 53. This gives him a definite lead.




Figure 4 (161 – 210)

Ko: 99, 102, 105, 108

Figure 4 (161 – 210)

White 74 is best: if at 'a' instead, Black answers at 76.

White 82 – 86. A desperation measure — White realizes that Black can get a ko.

Figure 5 (211 – 293)

Black 39 is sufficient compensation for the ko. Black plays the sequence to 49 in sente before connecting at 51. His lead is now rock-solid.

In contrast to the Oza series, Black had won



Kobayashi (R) evens the Tengen series by winning the fourth game.




Figure 5 (211 - 293)

Ko: 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32; 37: ko (at 27); 39: connects (right of 33); 45: connects (at 42); 82: ko (at 24); 84: connects (two spaces below 21); ko (at 79): 85, 88, 91; 93: connects (at 24)

all four games so far in this match. The betting was that whoever got Black in the last game would win the title.

Black wins by 2½ points.

(‘Kido’, February 1982. Translated by the editor.)

Game Five

White: Kato Masao

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played 28 December 1981 at the Nihon Ki-in

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio

This was the first time that the Tengen title match had gone the full distance. It was probably also the first time that a professional game had been played so late in the year.

Figure 1 (1 - 53)

Black 13. Playing on the centre right star-point would lead to a moyo contest.

White 16 is a strategic mistake. Black 17 is an excellent move which enables Black to seal White in on the side up to 25. This thickness gives Black an early advantage. White should play 16 at 17; if then Black 25, White could attach at ‘a’, threatening the two black stones on the side.

White 20. If at 1 in Dia. 1, White’s forces are scattered after Black 2 to 6.

White 26. White ‘b’ might seem more leisurely, but Black would attack at ‘c’ and build up his

Tengen Prizemoney
1st prize: ¥5,800,000
2nd prize: ¥1,160,000
Match fee – titleholder: ¥1,500,000
challenger: ¥1,000,000






Figure 1 (1 - 53)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

moyo at the bottom.

Black 29. Black could continue the attack with 31, but presumably he prefers not to settle the shape on the right. Moreover, 29 is an excellent point – a move by White at 29 would revive the aji of 20.

White 30. White 31 would just give Black a good defensive move at ‘d’.

Black 41. The follow-up to 29.

Black 47. Holding the atari at 53 in reserve is the key to Black’s strategy.

White 52. If White answers 51 at 1 in Dia. 2, Black hanes at 2, then peeps at 4, a very tough move for White to answer. If the Black ‘a’ – White ‘b’ exchange had been made, White would simply connect at ‘c’ in answer to 4 and would have no problems.

Black 53. Can the reader guess White’s response?




Figure 2 (54 - 100)
66: takes two stones; 67: retakes

Figure 2 (54 - 100)

White 54 shows fighting spirit. White is relying on the fact that he can connect underneath with 56.

Black 69, 71. Sacrificing the black stones is the wisest policy, for trying to save them would only make Black heavy.

White 72. White could also play 'a', Black 73, White 75, but the continuation would be difficult.

White 74 is better left unplayed; later White might prefer to hane at 75.

Both players played magnificently in the fight at the top. Black is probably enjoying himself more than White, but he is still faced with the very difficult problem of turning his moyo into territory.

White 76. A superb point.

Black 79. An indirect reinforcement of Black's cutting point at 'b'.

White 94 is a sign that White feels that he is behind. White is staking the game on being able to save his weak groups after Black 95.

White 96. White 'c' would provoke Black 'd', weakening White's eye-shape.

Black 97, 99. Black is making a serious attempt to capture the whole group.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 3 makes bad shape, but if White plays 1 in Dia. 3 next, he has no answer to Black 2. If White 'a', Black 'b'; if White 'c', Black 'a'.

White 8. White could probably live with White





Figure 3 (101 - 150)
Ko: 16, 21, 24; 26; connects



Dia. 3

14, Black 15, White 'a', but Black would be satisfied with this. White prefers to resort to a ko.

White 12. If White uses 12 as a ko threat, he must also play 14, otherwise Black might play there.

White 20. The position has developed into a direct ko for the life of the group. At this stage Kobayashi believed that he was in the lead and Kato felt that he was losing. Yet when the ko ended White had secured a win. This upset was the work of a moment.

Kobayashi: 'Black 27 was the losing move. Black 30, capturing the white stones with good aji, was the only move. I made the facile assumption that either 27 or 30 was good enough, that they were the same thing. One must devote the time to reading things out properly. However favourable a game may be, there is only one path to victory.'

Black 31. If Black cuts at 'b', White counters with 'c', Black 31, White 50, and Black must lose one of his four-stone groups.

Black 39. Even if Black blocks at 46, he cannot




Figure 4 (151 – 200)
77: connects (at 70)




Figure 5 (201 – 253)
14: at 12

hope to win the ko after White 'd'.

Figure 4 (151 – 200), Figure 5 (201 – 253)

White wins by 5½ points.

('Igo Club', March 1982. Translated by the editor.)

Kato was just a little lucky to win this game, considering how favourable it was for Kobayashi at one stage, but somehow he succeeded in defending his last stronghold. Victory in the Tengen title match redeemed what had been his worst year since he rose to prominence. He barely managed to win a majority of his games (29–26), he lost


his Honinbo and Oza titles, and his challenges for the Gosei and Meijin titles were soundly rebuffed. However, a bad year for Kato would be a good year for most other players: he did after all feature in five title matches and he still has his place in the ranks of the titleholders.

Kobayashi probably did not enjoy his New Year after this setback, but his spectacular form in 1982, especially his performance in the Honinbo and Meijin leagues, shows that he was not cast down for long. His reaction to losing the Tengen title match was to set his sights on something higher.


Life and Death Problems From Actual Play

Nakaoka Jiro 7-dan


The following life and death problems are all taken from actual play and include positions which come up very frequently. The best way to improve your analytical ability is to read out the problems completely in your head, without playing any stones on the board. This may require some discipline, but it will not only make you stronger at problem-solving but will also benefit your general fighting ability in the middle game.




1. Black to play



2. White to play



3. White to play



4. Black to play


Solutions

Problem One


Dia. 1. If Black 1, White 2 creates the 'comb', a well-known living shape.

Dia. 2. The placement at 1 looks like a tesuji, but it does not work, as White lives with 2 to 6. If Black 5 at 'a', White lives with 'b'; Black 5 at 'b' also fails because of White 'a'. Instead of 3 —


Dia. 3. If Black attaches at 3 here, White lives with 4 and 6. In short, Black 1 in Dia. 2 brings the dying white group back to life.




Dia. 1: alive




Dia. 2: alive



Dia. 3: alive



Dia. 4: correct
Result a ko



Dia. 5

Dia. 4. The clamp (hasamitsuke) of 1 is the correct move. If White 2, Black sets up a ko with 3 to 7.


Note that Black could also get a ko by playing 1 at 7, but the sequence in the diagram is superior.

Dia. 5. The position comes up when Black has a small knight enclosure and White invades at 1.


Problem Two

Dia. 1. One's first impulse is to block at 1, but White cannot live after 2 and 4.


Dia. 2. If White descends at 1, his illusions are quickly shattered when Black plays 2. Life is not




Dia. 1: naive



Dia. 2: optimistic



Dia. 3: good shape



Dia. 4
10: elsewhere

to be had.


Dia. 3. White 1 looks much more promising. In fact, this stylish move is the only way to live. There is no need to give variations — White 1 carries conviction. When a 'shape' move like 1 becomes second nature, you are justified in calling yourself a go player.

Dia. 4. The position is a variation of a two-space low pincer joseki. White attaches at 4 in order to settle his group quickly. White plays elsewhere with 10 and also ignores Black when he plays at 'a'. Black then attacks with 'b'.


Problem Three

Dia. 1. White 1 is pointless.


Dia. 2. If White 1, White can get a ko up to 7, but this is not good enough.




Dia. 1: a waste



Dia. 2: inadequate



Dia. 3: correct





Dia. 4

Dia. 3. White 1 exploits Black's shortage of liberties. When White hanes at 3, Black cannot block at 5, so his group dies.

Dia. 4. This sequence, which gives rise to the problem position, is often seen in actual play. After 17 Black has to defend in the corner.

Problem Four



Dia. 1. If Black 1, White repairs the defect



Dia. 1: mannen-ko Dia. 2: seki (or ko)

in his shape with 2. Black strikes at the vital points with 3 and 5, but the result to 8 is a 'mannen-ko' (ten thousand year ko, i.e. it cannot be resolved immediately — at the end of the game it will either become a ko or a seki).

Dia. 2. The combination of 1 and 3 sometimes works. White must answer at 4 — if 4 at 6, Black plays 4. Black 5 is too optimistic, however, for White gets a seki in the forced continuation to 14.



Dia. 3: correct Dia. 4: an irregular invasion

Better than 5 is setting up a ko with Black 6, White 5, Black 7.

Dia. 3. Black 1 and 3 are the correct combination. This easily kills White.


Dia. 4. Black makes a large knight move in response to 1, then ignores White 3 (probably played later on in the game). White then tries to trick Black with the invasion at 5.

('Igo Kenkyu', January 1957)


Test Your Rating

The following problems are designed to diagnose your real strength. Perhaps in this one article you may be able to work your way right up the kyu ladder. Dan holders are warned to steer clear — they may not score 100%.


Test for 8-kyu



1. White to play. Can he get proper eye-shape?




3. Black to play. He would like to secure unconditional life.




2. Black to play two moves in a row. Can he live?


Test for 5-kyu



2. Black to play. Can you find a way to kill the white group?




1. Black to play. What is the best sequence for both sides?




3. How many ko threats can White get?


Test for 3-kyu



1. White to play. What does your intuition tell you here?




2. White to play. Can you find a weakness in Black's corner position?




3. White to play two moves in a row. What is his best combination?


Test for 1-kyu



1. White to play. You should be able to spot the vital point immediately.



2. Can Black save the five marked stones?



3. Black to play. If he can capture the marked white stone, he can save his nine stones.

Answers begin on page 38.

Book Review

'Invincible: The Games of Shusaku'

The ad for *Invincible: The Games of Shusaku* proclaims 'a new departure in go publishing'. It is, in more ways than one. It is the first book in English language go literature to give full treatment to one of the major figures in go history. It is the first English language go book in high-quality hardcover, and it is the first collection of games I have read with a text as interesting as the games themselves.

There have been to date only two bound collections of go games in English. *The 1971 Honinbo Tournament* is a thorough account of a historically minor event. *Appreciating Famous Games* gives but a taste of the rich history of go. *Invincible* delivers more than a taste; it serves up a full-course meal.

Shusaku, born in 1829, began playing go at the age of four or five. His prodigious talent was noted

early and encouraged. By the time he was a teenager it was clear that he was a major talent. By the time he was out of his teens he had established himself at the pinnacle of the go world. At the age of 33, in 1862, he died of cholera.

In his short life Shusaku established himself as one of the greatest players ever. He has been posthumously referred to as a saint of go. His masterpieces offer profound teaching. *Invincible* presents Shusaku's lifework with the care, and high drama, that it deserves.

The book opens with a historical retrospection. There is also a chronology of events in the go world during Shusaku's time. Chapter 1 gives a history of go in the Edo period. Chapter 2 is a biography of Shusaku. Chapter 3 is an explanation of the Shusaku-style fuseki. Included in this chapter are historical period and latter-day professional games illustrating the development and use of this fuseki.

The subsequent chapters present Shusaku's games. Important games and series are introduced with a description of events surrounding the encounter. These introductions set the tone for the game(s) that follow. The players, their rank, the date, number of moves, result, and commentators are all given before the game record. A post-game commentary highlights the importance of the match.

The game commentaries, written by professional players, are informative and to the point, yet sometimes dramatic. 'Black 59 is a savage move which keeps the enemy forces divided.' 'This is a good opportunity for White to start a fight.' 'Black blithely discards four stones.' 'An exquisite sequence for Black.' 'Shusaku never really had a chance in this game' (a rarely expressed sentiment).

In the hands of these commentators the stones sometimes take on a life of their own. 'Black 25 is a little greedy.' 'White 46 is stubborn.' 'White 42 nips the attack in the bud'. 'Black wants to live independently on the side.' 'White is out, but where is he going?' 'White 88 is a declaration of victory.'

I have gone through games in *Go World*. Most of the time I ignore the commentary and just play through the game. The commentaries sometimes seem to me as if they had been dropped from outer space; I don't understand, and that is discouraging. If I don't understand why a move was played (a lot of modern pro games look like they were dropped from outer space too), I struggle through the explanation and accompanying twenty-move, what-if diagram. The reason for all this is the sophistication of modern pro go; the players think through the tesuji to the realm beyond, and play there.

There is none of that here. Shusaku played the simplest move he could find that would work. The simple beauty of his moves is something a kyu player can understand and appreciate.

Go has changed a lot since Shusaku's time, even for amateur players. After all, we are studying books written by today's professionals. The fuseki style today is quick development, with emphasis on influence, often at the expense of territory. In Shusaku's day the players fought for territory. Sometimes corners were left vacant until late in the middle game; the fighting starts as soon as there are enough stones on the board to make a struggle for territory worthwhile. A lot of these games are flat-out war. Finesse takes a back seat to getting the job done as directly as possible. You get to see the tesujis you've read about in beginner go books.

This is not to say that the games are not sophisticated; quite the contrary. Some of these games are classic examples of subtle play. Shusaku one time played a move so abstruse that his opponent's ears turned red from shock as he discovered the profound meaning of Shusaku's move.

Then there is the other side of the coin. The fuseki often seems strange to me. Sometimes the pace begins slowly, the players filling the corners with enclosures, then slugging it out on the sides and in the center. You are not going to see rapid full-board development; it was not the style back then. Hoshi joseki, with rare exception, were used only in handicap games, and almost invariably the response to a hoshi kakari is a keima, rarely a one-space jump. In other games, as mentioned before, fighting breaks out before all the corners are occupied. The action becomes fierce before a full-board framework is established. You rarely see that nowadays.

The legacy Shusaku left behind in the records of his games would by itself make this book worthwhile

reading. The study of Shusaku's games can be considered a must for any serious student of go. As the book says, 'Shusaku is considered the best model for aspiring professional players to study.'

'Aspiring professional players!', you might say. 'I'm just a kyu player. What will I get from this book?'

You will get a chance to see some of the most straight-ahead fighting to be found. The lessons learned from these bruising battles are something you can apply to your own game. You will admittedly see a different style of opening play, a third-line territory orientation. But it is interesting to see how the game has changed, and it does let you know that there is a vast world of fuseki style and strategy.

Invincible is more than just a collection of games; it is a treasure house of go history. It is a biography of one of the greatest go players the world has ever known. It is an inspiration, and it is a pleasure to read. It is a trip through time to a war zone the likes of which you may have never seen. You cannot buy a better slice of go history. And you won't find a better player to teach you fighting technique. Study the games and a little invincible is bound to rub off on you.

Gary Odom, 2-kyu

22 April 1982


Test Your Rating: Answers

8-kyu Problems


Answer to Problem One

Dia. 1. Dipping down to the first line with 1 is a good move. There is now no way for Black to attack White's group.


Dia. 2. Giving atari at 1 is a mistake. Instead of capturing the marked stone, Black will hane at 2. After 3 —




Dia. 1




Dia. 2




Dia. 3



Problem 2. Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Problem 3. Dia. 1

Dia. 3. Black can escape with 4 to 8, thanks to the marked black stone. White dies.

Answer to Problem Two


Dia. 1. Attaching at 1 is the only move — anything else lets White live.

Dia. 2. White 2 is the strongest resistance, but Black kills him with 3 and 5. The marked stone is crucial: without it White would live by giving atari at 'a'.


Answer to Problem Three

Dia. 1. The simple-looking move of Black 1 is sufficient.

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black just has to connect at 3. He is unconditionally alive.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Descending at 1 gives White the chance to set up a ko with 2 and 4. White could also simply play 2 at 4, but it is preferable to play the forcing move of 2 now just in case White loses the ko.


5-kyu problems

Answer to Problem 1


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the only move. White has no choice but to answer at 2.

Dia. 2. A ko results. White makes the first capture with 6.


In an actual game Black might keep 5 in reserve and try to create ko threats somewhere first.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2 6: ko



Dia. 3



Problem 2. Dia. 1

Dia. 3. White 2 is bad style; after 4 it is Black's turn to take the ko.


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 and 3 secure life for the group by capturing the two marked white stones. Calmly descending to the edge with 3 is important.


Dia. 2. Black 3 here is a failure. White counters with the oi-otoshi tesuji of 4 and 6.

Answer to Problem 3: three ko threats


Dias. 1 – 3. White gets three ko threats. Playing 5 last is important.




Dia. 2




Problem 3. Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5


Dia. 4. If White plays 1 first, Black captures at 2 –

Dia. 5. Then connects at 4, so White only gets two ko threats.


3-kyu problems

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. White 1 is the instinctive move. If Black blocks the way out with 2, White cuts at 3 and captures the black stones. If Black plays 2 at 5, White links up with 2.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 2. The atari at 2 does not worry White as he can live with the sequence to 11.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. If White 1, Black must answer at 2;



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White 3 next stops Black from getting a second eye. Note that playing Black 2 at 'a' does not work; White simply ignores 'a', pushing into the corner at 2, and capturing the two stones only gives Black one eye.


Dia. 2. Black must block at 4, so White gets an approach-move ko with 5. This could be troublesome for Black.

Note that if White plays 1 at 3 in Dia. 1, Black will live by playing at 1.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. White 1 and 3 kill the black group.


Dia. 2. If Black 4, White 5 gives 'bent four in the corner.'



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. White 1 and 3 here are the wrong combination. Black 4 is the vital point and Black lives. If White 'a', Black lives with 'b'.


1-kyu Problems

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. White 1 is the vital point: it enables White to capture the marked black stones by making good use of the marked white stones on



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

both sides.


Dia. 2. Resisting with 2 only increases the damage to Black's position. Simply capturing at 'a' is best for Black.

Answer to Problem 2: yes

Dia. 1. The placement at 1 is the key move: Black can save the marked stones. Playing Black 1 at 'a' would not work because of White 'b'; Black 1 at 'c' also fails when White plays 'b'.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 2. If White intercepts with 2, Black throws in at 3, then ataris at 5. If White plays 2 at 'a', Black links up with 2, taking a lot of profit.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a clever move which rescues the large black group by capturing the marked white stone.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Attempting to escape is futile. Black hustles White to the edge with 3 to 11 and White is helpless.

('Gekkan Gogaku', April 1977)


Good and Bad Style

Black to Play




96


Vulgar Style




This is a bad aji-keshi exchange for Black. He can do much better.




97




Black 1 to 5 cannot be called bad moves, but Black can improve on this result a little.




98




Black 1 and 3 are bad aji-keshi moves. Black gains almost nothing.




99



If Black 1, White 2 is an irritating answer. Black is unhappy with his shape.




100




Black pokes through with 1 and 3 – what a slow, plodding way to play go!


Correct Style




Black 1 is a clever tesuji which enables Black to link up his groups.




Capturing with 2 is about the best that White can do, but Black then sets up a connection by attaching at 2.




Black 1 is good style. If next White 'a', Black will be satisfied with linking up with 'b'.




If White tries to intercept with 2, Black counters with 3 to 7. This way he captures an extra stone, a gain on the result when he begins with 3.




In this shape Black can aim at attaching at 1.




If White captures a stone with 2 and 4, Black can cut off his centre stones with 5 and 7.




Black 1, at the 'corner' (kado) of the white stone, is correct style.



If White 2, Black 3 makes good, taut shape.



The hanekomi tesuji of 1 is the move of a go player. White is in trouble.




If White 2, Black 3 makes miai of cuts at 'a' and 'b'. The three marked white stones become booty.


The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan

How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. White has just played the marked two-space extension at the top, and three proposals have been made for Black's next move. Which one do you think fits the opening best?



Dia. A



Dia. C


A: Taking profit in the corner is the important consideration here, so I recommend the clamp at 1. Of course this will make White strong on the outside, but in this fuseki it doesn't matter because his thickness can't be put to much use.

B: Not so fast. Taking corner profit and giving White outside strength bungles the fuseki. Black needs a good, severe move like the hane. Anything else lets White have his own way.


C: Both of you are out in left field. Black wants to play solidly here. After all, pushing into the white stone with 1 has been around for a long time. Have you ever seen professionals play any other move in this kind of position?

Fuseki Analysis


In order to choose a joseki that is appropriate for a particular opening, it is necessary to examine the positions along the adjacent sides or in the adjacent corners. Checking the opposite corner is usually only necessary when a ladder is involved. In this issue's fuseki (fuseki diagram, next page) Black will play in the upper right



Dia. B




Fuseki Diagram




Dia. 1

corner, so he needs to look at the positions along the top and down the right side.

On the right, neither side has much potential for development. On the one hand, Black is open at the edge; on the other, his three marked stones are strong so that neither side wants to play near them. The top also is an uninteresting area. The low, solid white formation splits the black positions and makes the top a played-out area. A large move remains in the upper left, however, and the difference between Black 1 in Ref. Dia. 1 and White 1 in Ref. Dia. 2 is huge. Since the top and right side offer no possibilities, Black must choose a joseki that (1) takes as much profit as possible but (2) enables him to take sente to play first in the upper left.



Ref. Dia. 1




Ref. Dia. 2


A Wins the Debate

The attachment at 1 in Dia. 1 is the move which gives Black both profit and sente. Before continuing with the development of the fuseki, however, let's study the joseki in isolation.

The position in Dia. 2 comes about when White takes up a position at the top with 1 — usually because of its relation to the upper left — instead of answering directly in the corner. When White does answer in the corner, the joseki to the excellent extension at 4 in Dia. 3 follows.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

If Black plays elsewhere after White 1 in Dia. 2, he is hard put to find a good move after White 5 in Dia. 4 (the extension to 'a' is too narrow, but leaving the position as is gives White a very severe move at 'b'), so he usually answers at 'a', 'b', or 'c' in Dia. 2. If Black 'c', White 2 in Dia. 5 is absolutely necessary, since a black play there would be unendurable, and up to Black 5 is a one-way street. For example, if Black blocks from the outside with Black 3 in Dia. 6, White will get too much territory.




Dia. 4

Black may appear to be on the verge of collapse after Dia. 5, but that is appearance only.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

If White cuts with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7, for example, he will be in more trouble than Black when Black plays from the outside at 4. White 7 and 9 in Dia. 8 are probably the best he can do, but Black is satisfied with the thickness he gains on the outside in sente. White can capture two stones by cutting at 'a', but the capture is also gote and therefore small.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8

11: connects




Dia. 9. 9: connects




Dia. 10

Replacing White 5 with the cut at 5 in Dia. 9 leads to disaster. After Black squeezes with 6 and 8, the sequence to Black 16 in Dia. 10 will follow. If White now plays 'a', Black blocks at 'b'; if White crawls at 'b' instead, Black blocks at 'c'. Either way White is captured.

Since cutting twice in Dia. 7 fails, White




Dia. 11




Dia. 12

must cut only once, at 6 in Dia. 11, then turn at 8. Black would like to take the white stone with 1 and 3 in Dia. 12, but this is clearly no good when White cuts at 4. Black's only choice is to connect at 9 in Dia. 13.




Dia. 13




Dia. 14

If Black now plays elsewhere, White can put the marked stone to use with the two-stone sacrifice in Dia. 14. The sequence to 7 gives him perfect outside thickness. Though Black can consider playing this way, he usually captures the white stone with Black 13 in Dia. 15 (he could also consider cutting at 'a' with 13). The joseki comes to an end with White 14, a necessary move because the cut at 'a' will be severe after Black 13. Locally, his outside strength can probably be regarded as giving White a slightly superior result.




Dia. 15



Dia. 16

The importance of the cut at 6 in Dia. 11 can best be judged by comparing Dia. 16 with Dia. 15. If White turns at 1 without cutting at 2, Black connects at 2. White can only play atari at 3, then connect when Black connects. This is very uninspired play.


Playing out the standard joseki in Dia. 15 against the fuseki diagram gives the result in Dia. 17 (next page). Sente is Black's privilege and, after exchanging the approach at 1 for White 2 (or 'a'), he uses it to take the all-important point at 3. Black could of course play Black 3 immediately, but the Black 1—Black 3 combination is a more effective order of moves. Not only does Black have a good formation on the left, he has also taken considerable profit in the upper



Dia. 17

right. White, for his part, has built good outside strength in the upper right, but he has no way to make very good use of it. Moreover, he is dissatisfied because the marked stone has come to be too close to his own thickness. Black has an easy game.


If White tries to make use of his stone in the upper left with 2 in Dia. 18 after Black 1, Black will come out at 3. Because Black 1 puts him a move ahead on the left, Black can expect to do well in any fighting there.




Dia. 18

B's proposal


B has proposed the hane in Dia. 19. White can answer with 2 and 4 in Dia. 20 or simply the hane in Dia. 21. Of the two variations perhaps the one in Dia. 20 is more common. After White 4 in Dia. 20 Black's replies are 'a', 'b', and 'c'.




Dia. 19



Dia. 20




Dia. 21




Dia. 22

If Black cuts at 1 in Dia. 22, White must pull back at 2. Black then descends at 3 and the joseki comes to a pause. 'A' is left behind as a good point for both sides, while White has the option of strengthening the marked stone in Dia. 23 in sente with 1 and 3 (at the cost of giving White a ponnuki, Black can take sente with 2 in Dia. 24).




Dia. 23




Dia. 24

Switching Black 3 in Dia. 22 to 1 in Dia. 25 is not good because White has a sharp move at 2. If Black now connects at 4, White can come out at 3, but, when Black captures with 3, White 4 threatens a ko. Black cannot fight the ko, so he connects at 5 in Dia. 26, but White 6, threatening




Dia. 25




Dia. 26

to make life at 'a', puts him on the ropes: whether he takes the eye at 'a' or hanes at 'b', White will block at 'c'.

The second variation for Black begins with the descent at 1 in Dia. 27 ('b' in Dia. 20). When White extends at 2, Black blocks at 3, strengthening his position in the direction of the arrow. Compared to Dia. 22, Black takes a tougher territorial attitude in Dia. 27, while relaxing the attack on the white stones. It is not possible to say which variation is better, but Black can switch to Dia. 20 from Dia. 27 by cutting at 'a'.




Dia. 27




Dia. 28

If White connects at 2 in Dia. 28 after the black descent, Black hanes at 3, which leaves the white position short of liberties. Even if he hanes at 4, White still has an uphill fight when Black threatens to connect at 'a' after Black 5.




Dia. 29




Dia. 30

The third variation for Black is the hane at 1 in Dia. 29 ('c' in Dia. 20), which emphasizes the right side. After White connects at 4, Black should extend toward the center with 5. White will then answer at either 6 or 'a'. Blocking with 5 in Dia. 30 feels good, but Black will probably need another move to take care of all his cutting points.

If the patterns arising from Dia. 20 seem to be too promising for Black, White can avoid them




Dia. 31




Dia. 32

by playing the hane at 2 in Dia. 21. Black will cut at 3 in Dia. 31. If he then answers White 4 by crawling at 5, he is back at Dia. 22. The disadvantages from Black's point of view are that he has played according to White's wishes and has had to crawl painfully on the second line.


Instead of cooperating with White, Black can fight back with the connection at 5 in Dia. 32. White has no suitable follow-up, so he is likely to turn to another part of the board. Later he can think about moving out with 1 and 3 in Dia. 33, but playing these moves immediately accomplishes nothing because of Black 'a'.




Dia. 33



Dia. 34




Dia. 35




Dia. 36

When White answers the black hane at 1 in Dia. 34 at 2, Black 3 is the only move. If he connects at 3 in Dia. 35 instead, the result is unsatisfactory when White takes up a position around 'a' or simply plays elsewhere. Black 3 in Dia. 36 is also bad because White can still play around 'a', tenuki, or, in this case, block at 'b'. In both diagrams Black has played on the inside, so that the two white stones have become light and can be easily discarded.

B's suggestion will probably lead to the result in Dia. 37 (next page). Black 5 stresses attacking the three white stones, but after Black 7 White will switch to the upper left with White 8. If Black 9, White will pincer at 10 and Black's next move is unclear. The game will hinge on how effectively Black will be able to attack the white group on the right, but, whatever the outcome, White has managed to turn the game into a difficult one for Black.



Dia. 37




Dia. 41


Attacking the white group from the bottom would be pointless, so Black must attack it from above at 'a'. White will answer at 'b' or 'c', but Black now has a problem with finding a way to continue the attack.

C's Proposal

C has proposed Black 1 in Dia. 38. White 2 is the only move and up to White 4 is a joseki. Omitting White 4 is out of the question because




Dia. 38



Dia. 39

Black 1 in Dia. 39 would be too severe. For Black's part, switching 3 to 1 in Dia. 40 is bad because White can take aim at the vital point of 'a'. Furthermore, White will not extend to 'b', but will stake out a position at 'c' or 'd'.



Dia. 40


Playing out this variation against the fuseki diagram gives the result in Dia. 41. The left side is the same as in Dia. 17, but Black's profit in the upper right is much less. Moreover, White has no groups that can be attacked, while at the top his two-space extension has come to be ideally placed for erasing Black's thickness. Of the three openings this is the least desirable.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, June 1981. Translated by David Thayer.)


One Page Lesson: Endgame Technique

Kudo Norio 9-dan


Dia. 1 gives a standard corner shape which should be familiar to most go players. It occurs when Black has a star-point stone and White invades at the 3-3 point. There is a standard endgame sequence here with which you should be equally familiar, but just in case you are rusty this is a chance to refresh your memory.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 2. In actual play one often sees even fairly strong players follow the sequence here, but they should realize that they are giving White more profit in the corner than he is entitled to. In a close game this could make the difference.


In this result White gets five points in the corner, but from the point of view of endgame calculation this is not necessarily the result that one can assume. The reason —

Dia. 3. Black 5 and 7 in Dia. 2 are gote, so Black might not want to make these moves now. The correct way to calculate this corner is to assume Black 'a' and White 'b'. This gives White six points in the corner.

Dia. 4. The proper approach here for Black is to make the placement at 1: this is where White played in Dia. 2, so it is the vital point for both sides. After White 2, Black descends at 3.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 5. White next plays 4, but then he has to answer Black 5 at 6. The sequence to 7 is best for both. Later White 'a' and Black 'b' can be assumed, which means that White only has three points in the corner (the captured stones cancel each other out).

The result is that White gets three points less than in Dia. 3.

Dia. 6. When we professionals are playing with amateurs, we often play at 1. After the game the amateur sometimes asks if he could have killed the group, but he is missing the point. If you play at 1 —

Dia. 7. This is the shape one ends up with in the corner. This is a gain of four points over Dia. 5. In other words, White 1 in Dia. 6 is worth four points in gote.

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Detail from GP1

Go in Europe in the 17th Century


Jaap K. Blom

A thirteenth century game of Marco Polo, strong nidan and first European champion, against the Imperial Court weichi player does not exist. In several seventeenth century European texts, however, the game of go (weichi in Chinese) is referred to and even elaborately described. All forty-eight passages presently known to me stem from two sources: the travels of Matteo Ricci and of Niklaas Trigault, two Jesuit missionaries, to China and the visit to England of the Chinese 'Shin Fo-çung', who tried to explain the game to Thomas Hyde, librarian and Royal Court interpreter. Thomas Hyde was even the owner of a go set, presented to him by one Mr. Gifford, sometime governor of Fort St. George in Madras. So English go players, do have a look in your attics and local museums!

In 1575 Martin de Rada, an Augustine missionary, headed a Spanish embassy into China, sent out by the governor-general of the Philippines to propose an alliance between the two countries. Not even directly representing the Spanish king himself, they were politely detained in Foochow, where they stayed for over a month awaiting an answer from the Chinese emperor. They never received it. In the meantime, de Rada had collected a whole library of Chinese books. Probably one of the books he took along on his return to Manila contained a description of our game. De Rada later mentions possessing a book 'of every kind of their games'¹ and his successor Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza, who lists de Rada's books, mentions one on 'The order howe to play at the tables, and

at the chests [sic], and how to make sports of legerdemaine and puppets.'² The latter description is reminiscent of the way weichi and hsiangchi (Chinese chess) are often mentioned in the same breath, while later Ricci will call weichi 'il giuoco del tavoliero' and hsiangchi a form of 'il giuoco de' scacchi'. De Rada had a number of his books translated by Chinese residents in the Philippines, but, as you have gathered from the title of this article, I have found no indication that the book on games was among them.

Only a little later, Matteo Ricci's efforts to penetrate into China were to be more successful. Operating from the Portuguese settlement of Goa, he was permitted to visit Canton, as were the Portuguese merchants in Macao. Ricci adopted Chinese customs and commanded the respect of the Chinese by his knowledge of mathematics and the sciences. He came to be accepted in many respects as one of their mandarins. He even impressed the Chinese with his mastery of their language: his style was good enough to make him eventually one of their classic writers, as 'Li Matou' — who said that da Vinci was the last specimen of 'uomo universale'? An amusing story tells how Ricci first showed the Chinese a map of the world in the usual representation: with America on the left and China on the right side. The Chinese thought this not very worthy of belief. When Ricci drew them a map with annotations in Chinese, he cut open the Mercator cylinder through the Atlantic instead of through the Pacific. This transformation resulted in China



un'altra peſſa nel nulla, o togliano se e roſſo il peſſo che ſi a diavolo. il piu grande di
tutti i giochi, e uno di piu di cento pectore in ambe le parti bianche e nere, in un co-
soleno di trecento ceſette, e ſi giuoca che niente ſonando una ad una ſecondo l'uno o l'altro ſe
nel nulla alcune delle aduenſione nel tavolo ſignore di quel caſo e diſſe nel ſuo giuoco
che guadagno ſui caſo del tavolo e il vincitore. i addorini sono tanto duri a questo
giuoco che occupano alcuni volte ſette del giorno in esso, dando un giuoco piu di un ſora
e quei che sanno bene giuocare a questo giuoco se ben ſono ſono de d'uomo ota abilita con
ogni ſorte accortezza et ingegno et alcuni gli ſigliono per maestro ſe ingegnere a giuocare
a questo giuoco. De coſigli dei delati sono anco ricorsi ſpeculazione al ſuo giuoco

The paragraph on go in Matteo Ricci's 1610 manuscript
(Photo Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Rome)

Grauiſſimum inter eos ludi genus eſt huiuſmodi. In alueo ^{Aliud genus ludi grauiſſimum.} trecentarum cellularum plures, ducentis calculis colludunt, è quibus alij candidi ſunt, alij attriti. his calculis alter alterius calculos procurat in medium alueum relegare, vt reliquis deinde cellulis dominetur. ad extremum qui plures in alueo cellulas ſibi ſubiecit, victor appellatur. Hunc ludum auidiſſimè arripiunt Magiſtratus, & ſæpè maximam diei partem ludendo conſumunt; nam inter ludendi peritos, horam integram ludus vnus tenet. Qui huius ludi peritus eſt, tametſi alia nulla re inſignis fuerit, ab omnibus colitur, & euocatur. Imo nonnulli etiam eos ſolitis ſibi ritibus magiſtros legunt, vt ab iſs accuratè huius ludi rationem edſcant.

The ſame paragraph in Niklaas Trigault's Latin version, as firſt printed in Augſburg in 1615 (Photo UniversiteitsBibliotheek, Leyden)

being in the middle of the map, which of courſe greatly enhanced its credibility.

In 1600, after founding four previous miſſion poſts, Ricci was granted permission to live in Peking. There he later ſtarted writing his memoirs: the general of his order had requested him to do ſo in order to provide a blueprint for ſimilar miſſionary work elsewhere. Ricci had almoſt finiſhed his narrative 'On the entrance of the Company of Jeſus and Chriſtianty into China' when he died in 1610; in fact, he was only waiting for letters from his colleagues to incorporate their information in his text. The manuſcript he left is divided into five books, the firſt of which comprises a general account of China: it is intended as the background againſt which the other four books relate the advances of the miſſion. This firſt book contains the oldeſt known deſcription of go in a European language. A photocopy of the relevant page of the manuſcript was kindly ſent to me by Father Edmond Lamalle S.J. of the Archivum Romanum Societatis Ieſu and is in part reproduced with this article. As I am more at home with Latin than with Italian, I prefer to give a literal English translation of Trigault's reaſonably faithful Latin version:

'Moſt important among them is a ſimilar ſort of game. On a board of three hundred cabinets ſeveral, play together with two hundred ſtones, of which ſome are white, others black. With theſe

ſtones each takes care to baniſh the other's ſtones into the middle of the board, in order that he afterwards dominates the cabinets left. In the end he who has ſubjected to himſelf the moſt cabinets on the board is proclaimed the victor. Upon this game the Officials pounce moſt eagerly, & often they ſpend the major part of the day on playing; for among thoſe experienced in playing, one game takes up a full hour. He who is experienced in this game is, though he did not diſtinguiſh himſelf in any other matter, reſpected & invited by all. Yes, even ſome alſo chooſe them as teachers, according to the cuſtoms uſual to them, in order that they may thoroughly learn from them the theory of this game.'

The quote could eaſily be the account of ſomeone who has watched a game being played — conſidering that the event took place before New Fuſeki! That 'each takes care to baniſh the other's ſtones into the middle of the board, in order that he afterwards dominates the cabinets left', may be either a keen obſervation by Ricci or an explanation by a Chinese hoſt or guide ſtanding by. If Ricci had not at leaſt witnessed a game, he muſt have remembered and written down what had been told to him with remarkable accuracy. Another poſſibility is, of courſe, that he was rendering the impression he got from a Chinese book on our game.

Niklaas Trigault arrived in China in 1610 or

„ Sie haben ferner/noch ein fürtrefflicheres Spiel/unter
 „ ihnen/auf folgenden schlag:
 „ Es spielen ihrer viele/mit zweyhundert Steinen/deren
 „ etliche weiß/etliche schwarz seynd/auf einem Brete so in drey
 „ hundert felder/getheilet. Mit diesen Steinen/versuchet ein
 „ Jeder/des andern Steine/mitten ins Bret/(damit Er der ü-
 „ brigen felder/sich desto besser bemächtigen könne) zu setzen / und
 „ einzuschliessen. Wer nun die meisten felder/auf dem Brete/
 „ eingenommen hat/dem wird/auf die letzte/der Sieg/zugeschrie-
 „ ben. Dieses Spiel/wird von denen/so im Regimente sitzen/
 „ heftig beliebt/und gebraucht: Bringen auch oft/den ganzen
 „ Tag/damit zu. Da die Zehnigen/so auf diesem Spiele geübet/
 „ und verschlagen/wol eine ganze Stunde / dasselbe aufhalten
 „ können. Welcher nun/in diesem Spiele erfahren / und wol
 abgerichtet ist/ob Er gleich / in andern Sachen wenig verste-
 het/wird sehr hoch gehalten / und für andern herfür gezogen. “
 Zah es pflegen auch etliche / mit sonderlichen geprenge und ge-
 breuchen/dieselben/ auf daß sie nuhr dieses Spiel / recht und “
 auß dem grunde/erlernen mögen / zu Lehr Meistern zu erweh-
 len/und die zeit ihres ganzen lebens/ihrer gebrauch nach / (d. “
 pag: 90.) dafür zu halten. “

Gustavus Selenus' German version (Photo Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague)

1611, shortly after Ricci died. In 1613 he was assigned the task of reporting to the Pope and raising support for the China mission by recruiting new missionaries in Europe. He was given the Italian manuscript to take to Rome and he translated it into Latin during his voyage from China to India and after his arrival in Rome. Trigault added material from letters of other Jesuits — which Ricci himself had intended to insert — and sometimes embellished the story where he judged Ricci had been too modest.

As for the description of go, careful comparison of the texts of Ricci and Trigault reveals a number of minor differences and half a major difference. Ricci starts off with ‘the most important of all the games’, later emphasizes ‘... with these [stones] which they put down one by

one ...’, and has ‘over an hour’. On the other hand, Ricci does not explain ‘among those experienced in playing’ and has confined himself to ‘to teach to play this game’ instead of ‘in order that they may thoroughly learn from them the theory of this game’. Are these additions by Trigault to be regarded as interpretation by a critical reader or as completion by someone acquainted with the game? The ‘half a difference’ I’ve held in reserve solves that problem. Ricci has ‘uno [giuoco] di più di ducento pietrine [=pedine]’, which is ambiguous. It can be understood either as ‘one [=a game] with more than two hundred stones’ or as ‘one [=a game] of more [players] with two hundred stones’. Trigault opts for the latter possibility, which justifies the conclusion that he is merely translating Ricci’s

text, without any personal knowledge of the game (unless it be only in the form of *rengo*, which is not very likely).

The work of Trigault was published in Augsburg in 1615⁴ and was not only reprinted over half a dozen times before the end of the century but was almost immediately translated into French, German, Spanish, and ... Italian. Moreover, being one of the few extensive treatises on China existent at the time, it was quoted again and again. Thus, the description of *go* or a paraphrase of it crops up in a book on chess and its history by August von Braunschweig-Lüneburg ('Gustavus Selenus')⁵, collections of travels by Samuel Purchas^{6,7}, a monograph on China by Alvaro Semedo⁸, a history of the Jesuit order by Daniello Bartoli⁹, and a report of the first Dutch embassy to the emperor of China by Joan Nieuhof¹⁰. Most of these have been reprinted and translated several times. Of special interest are the readings of Selenus and of Nieuhof.

Selenus, when cataloguing the games related to chess found all over the world, quotes and translates the description of *hsiangchi* by Ricci and Trigault which precedes their description of *go*, and throws in the latter as a bonus. As appears from the page numbers Selenus mentions, he quotes from the first printing of the Latin edition. Most noteworthy in his German translation is that where I have 'to banish the other's stones into the middle of the board', he translates 'des andern Steine/mitten ins Bret/ ... zu jagen/und einzuschliessen': 'to chase/the other's stones/into the middle of the board/and to enclose them'. At first sight the puzzling addition 'and to enclose them' may seem to point to the rule of capture, which implies a knowledge of the game from another source of information. But probably this is a mere coincidence. After all, if one succeeds in denying the other player access to any of the four sides of the board, this amounts to enclosing the total of his stones as a whole in the centre of the board.


The paragraph of Ricci and Trigault indicates a possible strategy but does not give the rules of the game. Though the description is correct, it is far from clear and obviously does not permit a reconstruction of the game. This is also reflected in the fact that many versions abound with misreadings and misinterpretations. The paragraph by Nieuhof clearly demonstrates how far the

Maar het aller-aanzienlijkste en achtbaarste spel is dit. Zy speelen op een zeker bort, dat van binnen een holte, en rontom drie hondert huisjes heeft, met twee hondert schijven, die eensdeels wit, en eensdeels zwart zijn. Met deze schijven zoekt d'een des anders schijven in het midden van de holte te botsen, om alle de huisjes te winnen; daar in ook het winnen en verliezen van 't gansche spel bestaat: want die de meeste huisjes inkrijgt, wint het spel. Op dit spel zijn de Majestraten zelfs zeer verzot, en brengen daar dikwils heele dagen meê toe; want een enig spel duurt, als het van gauwe Speelders gespeelt wort, byna een geheel uur. Die op dit speelen wel zijn afgerecht, schoon datze in geen andre zaak uitmunten, worden van eenen iegelijk geviert en gecert. Ja, dat meer is, zommigen nemen zoodanige tot Leermeefters aan, om dit spel net en wel van hen te leeren.

*John Nieuhof's Dutch version (Photo
UniversiteitsBibliotheek, Leyden)*

meaning of a piece of text can go astray in the process of being translated and paraphrased again and again. Nieuhof has: 'Zy speelen op een zeker bort, dat van binnen een holte, en rondom drie hondert huisjes heeft, met twee hondert schijven, die eensdeels wit, en eensdeels zwart zijn. Met deze schijven zoekt d'een des anders schijven in het midden van de holte te botsen, om alle de huisjes te winnen': 'They play on a certain board, that has a cavity within, and three hundred little houses all round, with two hundred disks, that are one part white, and one part black. With these disks the one seeks to bump the other's disks into the middle of the cavity, in order to gain all the little houses'. Thus we end up playing a game related to *tiddlywinks* and *marbles*!

Now this is not as strange as it may first seem: the development can be understood. With the Romans of yore, dicing games were far more



Citation structure of the texts


popular than what we now call board-games. Bear in mind that Caesar said 'The die has been cast', and not the more appropriate 'The pawn has been sacrificed' after embarking upon his Rubicon gambit. Trigault, when translating Ricci, designated the board by the Latin word for 'gaming board', which usually indicates a diceboard and outside of the context of gaming even means 'tray'. Indeed in many translations a hollowed board figures, which unjustly looks familiar to us: no doubt the authors visualized a hollow in the top of the board instead of in the bottom. In that situation, someone was bound to come along and fall into the pit of trying to find a sensible explanation for the presence of that cavity. It happened to be Nieuhof.

It wasn't until 1694 that genuinely new information on go was introduced into the European libraries. Thomas Hyde, who never set a foot out of England, had in spite of that acquired a great knowledge of the Orient and its languages. Because of that, he acted as interpreter in court every time an Oriental visitor was received, and thus he also accumulated a great deal of knowledge that was not yet common in Europe. One of his contributions to the literature on Asia is a book 'On

Oriental games'¹¹, which contains a six and half octavo page chapter on go. In the last paragraph of the chapter on draughts, he cites 'Purchasius from our country' on go and tells us that he owns a go set himself. He begins his chapter on go with extensive quotes from Trigault, Semedo (in Italian), and Nieuhof (in Latin), stating that these are 'incomplete & mutually contradictory Descriptions from Jesuits'. Incomplete yes, but they are not contradictory: the Latin translation of the text of Nieuhof — not a Jesuit — from which he quotes is a very global version, leaving out many details and in that way by chance omitting Nieuhof's misinterpretations of go. Hyde proceeds even more arrogantly with the statement that due to his conversation with Shin he is now able to end all controversy. Then follows what is meant

as an explanation of how to play the game.

Evidently, Hyde didn't understand Shin's explanations himself. He describes the stones and the board and translates two Chinese names for the game: 'Hoy Ki' and 'Wei Ki', both meaning 'Game of the Circle'. This leads him to the notion of enclosure: a stone surrounded by enemy stones is captured, as illustrated by a diagram. Only when I later read in Leibniz that our game is a peaceful game without any killing going on, did I realise that Hyde never makes explicit that the captured stone is taken off the board. The pattern shown in the diagram is called an eye and making as many eyes as possible is the goal of the game. Here Hyde's narrative halts and starts all over again, comparing the number of stones to the dimension of the board. Both players alternately put their stones in their proper places, trying to capture an enemy stone by forming an eye. Stuck once more, Hyde proceeds to tell us the number of stones again — 'it is not necessary to bring all into play at once' — and starts off his explanation for the third time. Play usually begins in the centre of the board, and while placing and moving their stones both players strive to make eyes by capturing enemy stones. When one doesn't have enough stones on the board for that, one is



The go board as shown by Hyde (Photo UniversiteitsBibliotheek, Leyden)

allowed to take new stones from their bowl. (A previous phrase mentions that stones are taken out of their bowl as the need arises and elsewhere it is emphasized that stones are also captured before all have been placed on the board.) After one player is wiped off the board, the winner cries 'It's finished', and both players count the number of parts of the board they own (points? groups?) and the number of soldiers they have alive. Some unclear manipulation of these numbers decides the outcome of the game. To top off everything, Hyde adds that this description by 'his Chinaman' is not consistent with what is seen during actual play, which is not to be regarded as Hyde's fault. Quite a different stance from the one taken in his opening remarks. Hyde leaves the distinct impression that in his idea of the game the stones are running around all over the board in a physical sense.


One can't say much more than that through Ricci, Trigault, and Hyde, Europe knew of the existence of go. It was to be over a century and a half before the Western world deepened this acquaintance, when the essay by Herbert Allen Giles

and, later, the treatise by Oscar Korschelt enabled their readers to play the game.

It is my pleasure to acknowledge that Theo van Ees first brought the chapter from Hyde to my attention and so aroused my curiosity. The material this article is based upon was gathered in cooperation with Theo van Ees, Peter Polkinghorne, and Henk de Vries. Technical assistance in processing the photographs was provided by Rob van Dam.

Footnotes

1. Charles Ralph Boxer's 1953 translation of *Relation of the things of China*. Unfortunately, I have not seen the original Spanish work.
2. George T. Staunton's 1853 reprint of Robert Parke's 1588 translation of *The historie of the great and mightie kingdome of China*. A 1596 reprint of the 1585 work has 'De como sea de jugar a las tablas y al axedrez, y como an de hazer juegos de manos ytiteres [sic: 'and puppets']'. The 1587 Italian translation of Francesco Avanzo has 'Del modo di giuocar alle tauole, & a gli scacchi, & di far giuochi di mano.'
3. *Della entrata della Compagnia di Giesu e Christianita nella Cina*.
4. *De Christiana Expeditione Apvd Sinas Svscepta ab Societate Iesv*.
5. *Das Schach- oder König-Spiel*, Leipzig, 1616. As yet I have only found a copy dated 1617, probably a reprint. Several bibliographers mention 1616 as the year of publication.
6. *Purchas his pilgrimage*, London, 1617.
7. *Purchas his pilgrimes*, London, 1625.
8. *Relação da propagação da fe no reyno da China e outros adjacentes*, Madrid, 1641. Though I haven't found the original Portuguese book or the Spanish translation, I do know the 1643 Italian translation of Giovanni Battista Giattini.
9. *Dell'istoria della Compagnia di Giesu la Cina terza parte dell'Asia*, Rome, 1663.
10. *Het gezantschap Der Neerlandtsche Oost-*



The Chinese words translated by Hyde and his two diagrams. At left, two soldiers of either side, ready for battle, as Hyde tells us in the body of his text; at right, an eye. The caption informs us that the diagram on the left shows the way of placing at the outset. (Photo UniversiteitsBibliotheek, Leyden)

Indische Compagnie, aan den grooten Tartarischen cham, Den Tegenwoordigen Keizer van China, Amsterdam, 1665. The embassy described in this book was identified by Theo van Ees as 'the Batavian Embassy' Hyde refers to. Theo reported his find in *Go tijdschrift van de nederlandse go-bond*, 19/2, page 23 (1981).

11. *De ludis Orientalibus libri duo*, Oxford, 1694.

The photographs from Hyde accompanying this article are from a 1767 edition, as the copy of the original book I have access to is not in a state permitting photographic reproduction.

Editor's note. Illustrations in the text are the actual size of the originals.

Page from Go History (continued)




Figure 5 (156 – 200)

This game shows Genjo at his best. Early on he went on the attack and thereafter held the initiative throughout. His fine performance in this game must have been reassuring after his bad spell against Chitoku.

White wins by 10 points.




Figure 6 (201 – 262)

9: connects (at 6); 20: ko (at 16); 31: ko (at 17); 33: connects (at 16); 41: connects (right of 29)

Go in China (i)

John Fairbairn

A few years ago I was transfixed by a statement by Go Seigen. He said, in effect, that the greatest player who ever lived was his 17th century compatriot Huang T'ung-tzu.

I had never heard of Huang before and Go Seigen gave little information. Later I was able to ask players from mainland China if they knew of him and they did. They knew that he was a marvellous player but at that time were not allowed to delve into the past and couldn't tell me anything specific. These few years later I am still not a lot wiser, despite hours pouring over Chinese encyclopaedias, but this is what I have come up with so far.

Huang T'ung-tzu was one of the Three Go Sages of the Ch'ing era (1644 – 1912), along with Fan Hsi-ping and Shih Ting-an. There is virtually no documentary evidence about him and what there is is generally anecdotal.

Huang is also called Lung-shin and Yüeh-t'ien, but the appellation T'ung-tzu, which means 'child prodigy', is the one commonly used – it came from the fact that at the age of eleven by the Oriental count (nine or ten by our reckoning) he was 'two stones to a *kuo shou*', that is, he took two stones from a 7-dan. At 16 he was a *kuo shou* himself.

Huang was born between 1651 and 1653 in Kiangsu Province. Coming from a poor family, he was unable to go to school or acquire the normal attainments of a gentleman, which included go, in the usual way. But he picked up go by watching others play and he was fortunate that his talent blossomed when go was popular with the Ch'ing rulers.

Courtiers, administrators and rich merchants (especially the salt merchants) kept top masters as their permanent guests and Huang was able to acquire a patron too. Eventually, as he rose to be the top player of his time, he aroused the spiteful jealousy that appears to have been a feature of Chinese society of the period, and, though the date of his death is not known, he is believed to have been poisoned by rivals when he was about forty.

One aspect of Huang's greatness is that he contributed to the advancement of go theory in China. He was the first player there to appreciate the value of *amarigatachi*, which is explained in the game commentary below, and of earning territory while attacking. Previous Chinese players were able to analyse deeply but did not appreciate these points at all.

White: Huang T'ung-tzu

Black: Chou T'ung-hou

Commentary by Go Seigen

Figure 1 (1 – 17)

The initial arrangement of stones on the four corner star points remained typical of Chinese go for many centuries. It is commonly held that it arose to prevent Black from playing his first move at the centre, then beating White by playing mimic go thereafter, the strategies for overcoming the mimic not being widely known.

Black 3 was a common move of the day. Nowadays it would be at 8. Black 5 and White 6, spoiling for a contact fight straightaway, were also typical Chinese plays. Today Black 5 would be played at a big point elsewhere.

Black 7 and 9 are bad as they simply confirm





Figure 1 (1 – 17)

White's territory. Black 7 should be at 'a', threatening next either 'b' or 'c', followed by Black 'd', White 'e'.


White 10 is best in this case. The usual move one space to the left of 7 is answered by Black 12 and the defect at 'b' becomes too painful.

Black 11. Black 12 would be sounder.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Figure 2 (18 - 49)

Figure 2 (18 - 49)

Black 19 is slack. Given the black thickness on the left, it should be at 47.

White 20. White 'a' would be safer.

Black 21 goes for thickness. The modern style would be to play 27 to aim at invading at 'b'. Having suffered White 22, Black must play 23 and 25 and so loses the invasion at 'b'.

White 32. A more effective way for White to play is to cut at 'c' first, forcing Black 'd', then to descend to 32. White 34 likewise should be preceded by the cut at 'e'. Once 34 has been played, Black is not likely to answer a cut at 'e' or 'c' by connecting, but instead will lightly play atari on the outside. Had White cut first he could have taken sente.

Black 35 is good. It is sente — if White ignores it he dies, as shown in Dia. 1.

Black 43 is a superb point. White 44 and 46 are territory-minded moves, aiming next at 'f'.

Black 49. Chou, supposedly a rather imperious person, had a predilection for severe moves such as 49, but the hane is unreasonable here. Good shape demands Black 'g'; if White then pushes up with 49, good shape continues with Black 'h',




Figure 3 (50 - 100)

94, 97: ko

White 'i', Black 'j'.

Figure 3 (50 - 79)

Chou's aggressive play is now going to rebound on him, for Black 51 is another unreasonable move, as White 54 and 56 demonstrate. Black 57 cannot be at 58, otherwise White pushes through as in Dia. 2, White 6 signalling amarigatachi.

Black 63 at 64 seems good, but White 2 in Dia. 3 is sente against the corner, the threat being White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.

White 64 produces the amarigatachi mentioned above. Black has achieved nothing to add to what

he had before he began play in this corner, despite his apparently vigorous play. In contrast, White has come out in good shape, negating Black's influence on the left. White's play has been coherent, Black's incoherent.

Implicit in this is one of the many strategical concepts of go that have yet to be described fully in English. Here it is *amashi no giho*, the masters of which have invariably been among the greatest players. It consists in allowing the opponent to attack stones which are in an apparently precarious state but being confident (through having superior tactical skill) of being able to devise means for their escape. The attacker is tempted to base his strategy on killing these stones and when his failure to kill them is finally established he finds he has achieved nothing at all. His predicament is expressed by the verbs *amaru* (roughly = to have overplayed) or *amasareru* (to have been made to overplay) and his shape is described as *amarigatachi*. His tormentor's actions are described by the verb *amasu* (to induce overplays) or the noun *amashi*. In the days of no komi, amashi was a standard strategy for White and Honinbos Shusaku and Shuwa were among its greatest executants. Since the introduction of komi it has not been so necessary for White, but players such as Ishida, Rin and Kato frequently play amashi to great effect.

The so-called 'one-weak-group strategy' of amateurs is a crude version of amashi.

In China it was Huang who discovered the principle of amashi, including the more advanced version of making profit in the process. The profit in this game is that cuts starting with 82 suddenly come alive for him. Black's position has suddenly become awful.

White 80 is better than the usual extension to 'a' and 82 is better than the usual 86.

Black 81 looks good, but in fact White is immune from attack because of the defects in Black's shape. Connecting at 100 would be better.

After White 98 it is still too early for Black to decide whether to connect at 99 or 100. Therefore he should first play at 'b' to see how the fighting goes, striving to keep sente so as to come back to this group once he knows which connection is better. After White's capture with 100 Black is left with two stones floating in the centre.

Figure 4 (101 – 163)

Black's cut at 5 is unreasonable. He has to con-




Figure 4 (101 – 163)

nect at 13 instead; White would also connect then, at 5, whereupon Black could switch to 15 is good order. Although Black would still be losing, he would at least be able to see the rabbit's tail.

Black 13 at 18 is not possible because the ladder works for White: White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e' (ending in the top corner).


White's first slip (possibly intentional) was 16. Extending at 18 would have finished the game at once, with Black's three stones being safely captured.

White 26 is correct — if White plays 26, Black plays 28 and wins the race to capture by one move. As it is, it ends in seki and Black is back in the game.

White 48 and 50 are a tesuji combination.

Black 51. If at 'f', White would counter with 'g'. The reason why White plays 52 to 56 is to make thickness to cover the cutting points in his wall at the top. Otherwise 57 is the next big point.

White 62 is sente against the corner (Black has to live with 'h'), but White 'i' would be bigger as Black has more ko threats. White has the threat of a ko in the bottom right corner (see Dia. 4), but if he allows Black to encroach as far as 'j'



Dia. 4

in winning one of the kos, he puts his entire right side group in jeopardy.




Figure 5 (164 - 200)
76: ko; 89: connects; 99: ko

Figure 5 (164 - 200)

White 76 should be at 83 to keep the entire black group under attack.

Black 99. If he doesn't take the ko now, White will play the sequence in Dia. 4 and that will be decisive. If it were just a question of the ko in the bottom right corner alone, Black would be quite safe because he has an abundance of ko threats.

White 100 is quite big, especially as it stops Black 'a', which aims at the cut at 'b'.

Figure 6 (201 - 250)

White 36 at 37 fails because Black 45 is sente and guarantees connection at 'a' after Black 36 and White 'b'.

Figure 7 (251 - 322)

White 64, on the face of it, is incomprehensible. But the final result is a draw, which is rare in Chinese go. It depends on having a seki on the board and it seems probable that Huang deliberately chose to play for the seki and the subsequent draw with 64, perhaps to please his patrons. At any rate, had he played 66 he would have won by one point.

Result a jigo

The Chinese method of counting

All neutral points must be filled in the normal order of play. Each one occupied counts as one point, so the order is important. Any stones




Figure 6 (201 - 250)

ko: 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 29, 32; 38: connects




Figure 7 (251 - 322)

ko: 78, 81; 87: connects (below 73); ko (at 84): 88, 91, 94, 97, 100, 103, 106; 107: at 79; 108: at 89; 109: ko; 110: cuts to left of 104; 111: at 104; 112: ko; 114: connects; 115: ko; 117: left of 99; 118, 121: ko

captured during the game are ignored completely and any dead stones on the board are removed and also ignored.

Each player's points total is then the sum of the number of points he occupies plus the number of points he *can* occupy (i.e. the number of points that would be territory under Japanese rules).

In practice, only one side counts his score. Knowing that there are only 361 points on the board, whoever gets 181 or more must win, by however many points he exceeds the halfway figure of 180½. Thus, if only Black counts up and

he has 184, he wins by $3\frac{1}{2}$; but if his total was 178 he would lose by $2\frac{1}{2}$ (and White would win by $2\frac{1}{2}$).

However, sekis and handicap points affect this. Handicaps I will leave till later, along with some variations, but in the case of sekis the principle is that each player counts one for each point he surrounds, including false eyes (i.e. points where the opponent could not play without committing suicide or being captured), whilst any point that neither side can lay claim to is counted as $\frac{1}{2}$ each. In this game White scores $2\frac{1}{2}$ for the vacant points in the seki ('a' is the half) and Black scores $3\frac{1}{2}$.

The result is that both sides have $180\frac{1}{2}$ — a draw.

(Note: a common way of doing the counting is to shape one side's territory into easily countable units à la Japonaise, count the territory, then remove the opponent's stones and shape the remaining stones into easily countable units, and add the two totals.)

Part of the anecdotal evidence about Huang is in a letter of introduction written by Tu Chun (also called Tu Kan-huang), who was apparently a 7-dan himself. The gist of it is as follows:

'Huang T'ung-tzu of T'ai-hsien was called a child prodigy when he was eleven because he was good at go. He excelled whenever he played go.

'In the year 1666 I was a guest of Chiang Tu when Huang's father came with the child to pay his respects. He was wearing a black silk short robe but was a mere toddler. Seeing this I had to laugh.

'They left, but five years later I was on a visit to T'ai-hsien when Huang's father again came to pay his respects with T'ung-tzu. By then he was much bigger and when I spoke to him I was pleased to find that he was very bright. When I asked him about go he said he was as good as before. I inferred his meaning, which was that he was a match for me. I found this very strange, but I sat down to play, and he proved to be my match.'

Regretfully they said farewell for they were on their way north to Peking so that the child could polish up his skill and then call on a famous general.

'This general patronized Huang, gave him much money and set him up in a felt tent with koumiss to drink in the sun (the appurtenances of a fine life-style for people associated with the Mongols

— koumiss is a fermented milk drink).

'After living there for a year Huang thought of his mother and wanted to return South. The general allowed this but made him promise to come back — which shows how much he loved him.'

Loved by the general or not, Huang was evidently not generally popular. One story of his death is given by Pao Wei-ting in the preface to his book *Kuo I* (The National Game):

'His manner of placing his stones was fairy-like (fairy: a Taoist adept who could, people believed, fly like a fairy) and he was not aware that he was transported.

'He defeated all the best players of the day and they all envied him. Coupled with venery, this led to mental derangement and sickness.'

A similar story is given in other books.

The book *I Hua* (Go Stories) by Liu Yu-chi tells a story of Huang and another go player, Hsü Hsing-yu.

Hsü was a Councillor and so had access to information from within the Imperial Palace. Prior to a game he was due to play with Huang in front of the Emperor, Hsü beseeched Huang, 'You are much better than I am and I never win. Just for once let me win, by one point, so that I can make a name for myself.'

Huang agreed. The next day the Emperor, before the game, produced a gold and lacquer box, saying that the winner should have its contents.

Huang nevertheless kept his promise and lost. The Emperor merely said to Huang, 'Your go is much better, but your luck is worse.' He then ordered the box to be opened and inside were the letters of appointment to prefectural governor. They were handed to Hsü while Huang stared in amazement. But he kept silent.


This story seems apocryphal. The Emperor was said to be Kao Tsung, who reigned only from 1736, and all the other literature puts Hsü firmly in the role of respectful pupil to Huang.

Of the ten games that remain between Huang and Hsü (74 of Huang's games remain all told) several are with handicaps of over two stones and at the time of their most famous encounter, known as the Tears of Blood, Hsü was 'two stones to a *kuo shou*', which meant that Huang as a *ta kuo shou* (Meijin) gave him three stones.

But the game above, Huang's most famous, probably tells us more than anything how good he was.


味消し Aji-Keshi: Erasing Potential

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. When White is building up his moyo as in this position, the shoulder-hit of 1 is a good way to reduce his potential.




Dia. 2


Dia. 2. If White answers at 2, Black makes good shape with 3 to 7. Black has driven a wedge through the centre of White's moyo. In this case Black 1, 3 and 5 can be considered forcing moves (kikashi).

Dia. 3. However, what difference does it make if Black has the marked stone at the top?


Dia. 4. The sequence to 6 is the same as in Dia. 2, but here the result is very bad for Black. This time Black's three moves are aji-keshi: they have helped the opponent to strengthen himself. Playing next at 'a' is not appealing for Black, since his position is open at the side at 'b'.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 5. All the same, if Black blocks at 1, White will strike at the vital point with 2. If next Black 'a', White hanes at 'b', and Black gets very bad shape.


The above example makes it clear that the one and the same sequence can be either 'kikashi' (forcing) or aji-keshi, depending on the surrounding position. In the position in Dia. 3 —

Dia. 6. The extension to 1 is the key move. This move takes aim at all kinds of aji in White's corner. For example —

Dia. 7. Black could attack with the 1 — 3 combination. There are many continuations — Dias. 8 and 9 just give one example. After 12 in Dia. 9,



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Black 'a' is sente. This is much, much better for Black than the result in Dia. 4.


Dia. 10. Black can also aim at the 3—3 point invasion. If next White 'a', Black 'b', the sequence reverts to Dia. 7.

Dia. 11. If White 2, Black hanes at 3. Note that this result —


Dia. 12. Is the same as if Black had invaded in this position.




Dia. 9




Dia. 10




Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

Dia. 13. The moves to 13 are one standard pattern. Black usurps the corner territory in sente.

The above demonstrates that the large knight enclosure is much thinner (= weaker) than the small knight enclosure. The addition of the black stone at 1 in Dia. 6 creates various kinds of aji in the corner. The sequence in Dias. 3 and 4, though it keeps sente, is aji-keshi and represents a loss for Black. This is in contrast to the same sequence in Dias. 1 and 2.

Dia. 14. If White wants to reinforce the corner after 1, the standard moves are White 2 and 'a'.

('Gekkan Gogaku', August 1977)

Page from Go History

Genjo v. Chitoku (iii)

John Power

In 1797 the balance between Genjo and Chitoku was briefly disturbed when Chitoku forced Genjo to *sen-ai-sen*, the handicap for a 1-dan difference. Chitoku had reached even against Genjo in 1790, but had later been forced back to *sen-ai-sen*. It took him only six games to get back to even again, and since then he had taken a lead over Genjo, winning eleven games to seven. A lead of four games was the condition for changing the handicap, so for the first time Genjo had to play on *sen-ai-sen*. It took him just eight games to get back to 'normal' against Chitoku — these two were so close in strength that the player taking white was rarely able to win.

After he got back to *tagai-sen*, however, Genjo must have relaxed, for he promptly lost three games in a row and so was in danger of being forced to a handicap again. He won the fourth game, playing black, and the game given below is the fifth. Although taking white, it was essential for Genjo to win to get out of danger.

At this time Genjo and Chitoku were probably both 5-dan. Genjo had been officially appointed as the heir to Retsugen in 1798, so he is referred to as Honinbo (he became the 11th Honinbo in 1809). Chitoku did not become the Yasui heir till 1800.

White: Honinbo Genjo

Black: Nakano Chitoku

Date: 18 September, 2 December 1799

262 moves. White wins by 10 points.

Commentary by Tainaka Shin 9-dan

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

The fuseki to 9 is a little unusual. Black is emphasizing the top. Instead of 7 he could also extend to 13. White attacks immediately with 10 and 12.

White 18 is a clever move. Instead —

Dia. 1. If White 1, Black blocks at 2. If White cuts at 3, Black pushes out with 4 to 8 and White cannot stop him.

Black 19. It is also tempting to play at 1 in *Dia. 2*. If White intercepts at 2, Black plays 3 and 5 and should be able to settle his group. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 3. If White connects at 1, Black gets a good result with 2 to 6.







Figure 1 (1 – 50)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

White 22 feels good. Even if White played at 'a', Black would still jump to 23, but having a stone at 22 works better for White than 'a'. In effect, White 22 makes *miai* of capping at 23 and playing the continuation from 24.

Black 33. The high pincer at 34 would work better with Black's top left corner enclosure.

Black 39. This was the *joseki* of the time, but the result to 44 is bad for Black. Instead he should play the shoulder-hit at 1 in *Dia. 4*.


Dia. 4. Black 7 is a stylish move. If White captures at 'a', Black answers at 'b'. Instead of 2 —

Dia. 5. White might answer peacefully with 2 and 4. The result to 5 is still better for Black than

in the figure.

Actually one cannot criticize Chitoku's play here too strongly, for the knight's move of 1 in Dia. 4 was not yet known. It was an invention of Genjo's successor, Honinbo Jowa.

Black 45. Invading is essential — Black cannot let White take all the right side.



Dia. 5




Figure 2 (51 – 84)


Figure 2 (51 – 84)

White 52. An aggressive move, typical of Genjo. White is hoping to engineer a double attack on this group and the one at the bottom left. For that reason, Black attempts to settle himself on the side instead of running out into the centre. He more or less succeeds up to 61, but at the cost of giving White sente.


White 62 is a superb point. If White extended to 64 first, Black would secure his group by playing at 62.

Black 65, 67. One can see these moves either as accepting the challenge or as overplays which fall for White's strategy. The commonsense approach here would be to follow Dia. 6, but perhaps Black was not confident that he could get enough territory this way to win. At any rate, White 66 and 68 are a very powerful counterattack.


White 70, 72. An excellent indirect answer to




Dia. 6



Dia. 7




Dia. 8




Dia. 9

the peep at 69 — simply connecting would be too submissive. Black 69 threatens the sequence in Dia. 7; White 70 and 72 not only defend against that but also set up a sente capture at 'a'.

Black 73. If Black now tries 1 in Dia. 8, he is



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

unable to cut at 'a'. Cutting at 1 in Dia. 9 does not work either; Black must connect at 5, but after White 6 and 8 he is in more danger than White.

Black 77 is a sharp tesuji which forces White to answer docilely at 78. If White resists —

Dia. 10. If White 1, Black cuts off the centre stones with 2 to 6.

White 82 is the only move. White 1 in Dia. 11 would be unreasonable; Black would force with 2 to 6, then move out with 8 and 10.

The whole sequence from 77 to 84 seems forced. For the time being, at least, Black has settled his group, but his two stones 65 and 67 now look sick. White's attack has been a success and it is now clear that Black 65 was an overplay.

Figure 3 (85 – 120)

White gets good thickness with 86 and 88. Black has the tesuji of 91 to secure life, but he is far from happy. White gets sente to attack at the top with 98 and 100.

Black 101. Since White is going to force with 102 and 104 anyway, Black has to cut rather than answer on the third line.

Black 113. Black would like to cut at 114, but White would then give atari at 'a', forcing Black 119, then attack Black's large group with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'. The group might be hard put to live.

Figure 4 (121 – 155)

Black 35. If Black 40, White will defend the corner with 39; Black could then play a ko with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', but unfortunately Black does not have the ko threats. Moreover, his group at the bottom right would die if he lost the ko.

Black has to be satisfied with the placement at 39, but when White continues his attack with 44 he is forced to sacrifice five stones. Black barely manages to escape with 51 and 53, but he has




Figure 3 (85 – 120)






Figure 4 (121 – 155)



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

suffered too much damage to have any chance of winning.

White 54 is sente. If Black omits 55, White can get a ko in the corner.

Dia. 12. White descends at 1 and Black has no way of securing the corner. If Black 2, White gets a ko with 3 to 9. Instead of 2 —

Dia. 13. If Black 1 here, White still gets a ko with 2 etc.

Continued on page 56.

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
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